The following data are given for a duopoly market :
P = 100 − 0.5 (q₁ + q₂)
C₁ = 5 q₁
C₂ = 0.5 q₂²
Suppose the duopolists recognise the mutual interdependence and decide to act as one group to maximize the total profit of the industry. Find out q₁, q₂, P and the profits of the firms denoted as π₁ & π₂.
15 marks · directive: Find
The core of a good answer
Acting as a joint profit maximising cartel, the firms produce q₁ = 90 and q₂ = 5 (total 95), sell at P = 52.5, and earn π₁ = 4275 and π₂ = 250, a joint profit of 4525.
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What the question asks
This is a cartel (collusive duopoly) problem: maximise industry profit with respect to each firm's output, which gives the rule industry MR = MC₁ = MC₂. The answer should show the first order conditions, solve them, check the second order condition, and compute price and each firm's profit.
Answer outline
Introduction
Given: inverse demand P = 100 − 0.5Q with Q = q₁ + q₂; C₁ = 5q₁ so MC₁ = 5; C₂ = 0.5q₂² so MC₂ = q₂. Method: maximise joint profit π = P·Q − C₁ − C₂.
Step 1: joint profit function
- π = [100 − 0.5(q₁ + q₂)](q₁ + q₂) − 5q₁ − 0.5q₂²
- Total revenue TR = 100Q − 0.5Q², so industry MR = 100 − Q.
Step 2: first order conditions
- ∂π/∂q₁ = 100 − (q₁ + q₂) − 5 = 0, so MR = MC₁: q₁ + q₂ = 95
- ∂π/∂q₂ = 100 − (q₁ + q₂) − q₂ = 0, so MR = MC₂: 100 − 95 = q₂, giving q₂ = 5
- q₁ = 95 − 5 = 90
Step 3: second order condition
- Hessian: ∂²π/∂q₁² = −1, ∂²π/∂q₂² = −2, ∂²π/∂q₁∂q₂ = −1
- Determinant = (−1)(−2) − (−1)² = 1 > 0 with ∂²π/∂q₁² < 0, so the point is a maximum.
Step 4: price and profits
- P = 100 − 0.5 × 95 = 52.5
- π₁ = 52.5 × 90 − 5 × 90 = 4725 − 450 = 4275
- π₂ = 52.5 × 5 − 0.5 × 5² = 262.5 − 12.5 = 250
- Joint profit π = 4275 + 250 = 4525
Conclusion
Result: q₁ = 90, q₂ = 5, P = 52.5, π₁ = 4275, π₂ = 250. Check: MR = 100 − 95 = 5 = MC₁ = 5 = MC₂ (q₂ = 5), and P × Q = 4987.5 minus total cost 450 + 12.5 = 462.5 gives 4525.
Examples and data to cite
- Output is allocated so that marginal costs are equal across plants, like a multi-plant monopolist: firm 2 has rising MC and produces only until its MC reaches 5.
- Firm 2's share of the cartel profit (250) is small; side payments may be needed to keep it in the cartel, since under Cournot competition it would produce more (the Cournot outputs are q₁ = 80, q₂ = 30).
- OPEC, which sets production targets and prices among its members, is the standard real world example of a cartel; members face an incentive to cheat on the agreement.
Facts to remember
- Cartel (joint profit maximisation) rule: MR(Q) = MC₁(q₁) = MC₂(q₂).
- For linear demand P = a − bQ, MR = a − 2bQ; here a = 100, b = 0.5 so MR = 100 − Q.
- Second order condition for two variables: π₁₁ < 0 and π₁₁π₂₂ − π₁₂² > 0.