Explain whether the parallel imports violate provisions of TRIPS and affect the pricing policy of a patent holder MNC. Give reasons why all rich nations do not follow this ?
15 marks · directive: Explain; Give reasons
The core of a good answer
Parallel imports do not violate TRIPS, because Article 6 leaves exhaustion of IP rights outside dispute settlement and the Doha Declaration (2001) confirms each member may choose its own exhaustion regime; they do, however, undercut a patent holder's international price discrimination, which is why many rich, innovator countries keep national or regional exhaustion to protect R&D incentives.
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What the question asks
Part one (7 marks) needs the legal position under TRIPS and the economic effect on an MNC's pricing; part two (8 marks) needs the reasons rich countries restrict parallel imports. Use the concept of exhaustion and Ramsey style price discrimination.
Answer outline
Introduction
A parallel import is a genuine product put on the market in one country by the patent holder or with its consent, and then imported into another country without its authorisation; whether this is allowed depends on the doctrine of exhaustion: national, regional or international.
TRIPS position
- TRIPS Article 6: for dispute settlement, nothing in the Agreement shall be used to address exhaustion of IP rights, subject only to national treatment (Article 3) and MFN (Article 4).
- Article 28 gives the patentee an exclusive right of importing, but footnote 6 makes it subject to Article 6.
- Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (14 November 2001), paragraph 5(d): each member is free to establish its own regime for exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions.
- Hence parallel imports are TRIPS compatible: the WTO notes that the Doha Declaration clarifies members can choose how to handle exhaustion to suit their domestic policy goals.
Effect on the MNC's pricing policy
- MNCs practise third degree price discrimination: lower prices in poor, elastic markets and higher prices in rich, inelastic ones.
- Parallel trade arbitrages the price gap; low priced goods flow to high price markets, eroding profits.
- Response: uniform higher global prices, delaying or not launching in low price markets, supply quotas to distributors, differentiated packaging or brands.
- Result can be loss of access in poor countries, the opposite of the intended affordability gain.
Why rich nations do not all allow parallel imports
- They are net exporters of IP; protecting patentees' returns supports R&D, which in pharmaceuticals has high fixed costs recovered through price discrimination.
- Price discrimination can raise welfare by expanding access in poor markets (Ramsey pricing logic); international exhaustion would reduce supply to low income countries.
- Concerns over product safety and regulatory control of imported goods.
- Regional integration: the EU and EEA apply exhaustion between member states, but EU trademark, design and copyright law bars it for goods first put on the market outside the EU/EEA.
- Lobbying by pharmaceutical and technology industries and commitments in free trade agreements (TRIPS plus provisions).
Exceptions among rich countries
- The United States Supreme Court adopted international exhaustion for copyright in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley and Sons, holding that the first sale doctrine applies to copies lawfully made abroad.
Conclusion
Parallel imports are a legitimate TRIPS flexibility, valuable to developing countries for access to medicines, but they conflict with MNC price discrimination; rich countries' choices reflect their interest as IP exporters.
Examples and data to cite
- Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2), adopted 14 November 2001, paragraph 5(d).
- Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley and Sons (United States Supreme Court) on international exhaustion of copyright.
Facts to remember
- TRIPS Article 6: exhaustion excluded from WTO dispute settlement except for national treatment and MFN.
- Exhaustion regimes: national, regional (EU/EEA), international.
- TRIPS Article 28.1(a) gives the patent owner the right to prevent importing without consent; footnote 6 makes this subject to Article 6.
- Parallel imports are genuine goods, not counterfeits.