What, according to Aristotle, is the fundamental problem of metaphysics? Discuss this in relation with Aristotle’s account of the essence of the world, where he rejects the views of both the Atomists and Plato.
20 marks · directive: Discuss
The core of a good answer
For Aristotle the oldest question of philosophy, "what is being?", is really "what is substance (ousia)?" (Metaphysics Z.1, 1028b4); he answers that the primary being of a thing is its form or essence realised in matter, rejecting accounts that give only material constituents, such as the Atomists', and Plato's view that essences are separate, universal Forms.
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What the question asks
Two tasks: state Aristotle's fundamental problem of metaphysics (being qua being, reduced to substance), and show how his account of essence (form, actuality) is built in opposition to both materialism and Platonism.
Answer outline
Introduction
Aristotle calls first philosophy the study of being qua being (Metaphysics Gamma). Since being is said in many ways but always with reference to substance, the central question becomes: what is substance?
The problem
- Metaphysics Z.1 (1028b2 to 4): the question asked of old and always, what being is, is just the question what substance is.
- Categories: substance is that which is neither said of nor present in a subject; qualities, quantities and relations exist only as belonging to substances.
- Z.3 lists candidates for substance: essence, universal, genus and subject (substratum); the subject may be matter, form or the compound.
Aristotle's answer
- Matter cannot be primary substance because substance must be separable and a this (tode ti) (Z.3, 1029a28).
- Definition and essence (to ti en einai) belong primarily and without qualification to substances (Z.4, 1030b4 to 6).
- Z.7 to 9: by form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance (1032b1). Form is actuality (energeia); matter is potentiality (Theta).
- In Lambda the first mover is a substance whose very being is activity and which is without matter.
Against the Atomists
- The question names the Atomists. Aristotle's four causes (Physics II, 194b) make the material cause, that out of which a thing comes to be, only one of four: the form, the source of change and the end are also needed.
- So an account of the world in terms of material constituents alone cannot say what a thing is; that is the job of form or essence.
Against Plato
- Z.13: no universal is a substance; there is not some animal beyond the particular ones (1038b33).
- Lambda 6: eternal Forms are of no use as explanation unless something is capable of causing change; essences are immanent in individuals, not separate.
Conclusion
Aristotle's middle path makes essence real but immanent: substance is the form of a concrete individual, neither mere matter nor a transcendent Idea.
Examples and data to cite
- Metaphysics H.6: the bronze is potentially round, and round is what the bronze actually is when it has received this form.
- Aristotle's four causes (material, formal, efficient, final), Physics II, 194b.
Facts to remember
- Metaphysics Z.1, 1028b4: "what is being?" is the question "what is substance?".
- Z.3 gives four candidates for substance: essence, universal, genus and subject.
- Z.13 argues that universals are not substances.