Describe Sartre’s notion of consciousness as ‘nothing’. How is it different from Husserl’s notion of consciousness? Discuss.
15 marks · directive: Describe; Discuss
The core of a good answer
For Sartre consciousness (the for-itself) has no ego or fixed nature of its own: it works through negation, a being which is what it is not and is not what it is, set against the full being of things (the in-itself); Husserl, though also holding that consciousness is intentional, places a transcendental ego within consciousness and treats subjectivity as the source of all sense.
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What the question asks
Two parts: describe Sartre's thesis and its grounds, then show how it departs from Husserl on the ego, on constitution and on the being of consciousness.
Answer outline
Introduction
Sartre took Husserl's principle that all consciousness is consciousness of something and radicalised it in The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) and Being and Nothingness (1943).
Sartre: consciousness as nothing
- Being-in-itself is the pure plenitude of things; being-for-itself is consciousness, which works mainly through negation and is 'a being which is what it is not and is not what it is'.
- Negation is met in experience before reflection: waiting for Pierre in a cafe, the whole cafe is cast in the shade of his absence.
- Pre-reflective consciousness has an immediate, non-thetic awareness of itself; reflection reaches the self only as an object, the Ego.
- Because the for-itself has no fixed identity, as a chair or a pen-knife has, existence precedes essence.
Husserl
- Every experience is consciousness of something; later Husserl analyses both the act (noesis) and its correlate (noema).
- Ideas I (1913) marks his turn to transcendental idealism and posits a pure or transcendental ego as the unifying structure within consciousness.
- Transcendental phenomenology treats subjectivity as the locus of all formations of sense and validity; Husserl sometimes calls objects relative and subjects absolute.
Differences
- Ego: Sartre argues the ego is a transcendent object, outside, in the world, like the ego of another; a transcendental ego would add an opacity that consciousness does not show.
- Realism: Sartre's article on intentionality read it as intrinsically realist, against the transcendental idealism of Husserl's Ideas I.
- Ethics: Sartre's negating consciousness grounds his account of freedom and of bad faith, as in the waiter who plays at being a waiter.
Conclusion
Sartre keeps Husserl's intentionality but empties consciousness of ego and content, turning a transcendental subject into a free nothingness.
Examples and data to cite
- Sartre's example of looking for Pierre in a cafe: his absence is a negation met in experience (Being and Nothingness).
- Sartre, Intentionality: a fundamental idea of Husserl's phenomenology (1939).
Facts to remember
- The Transcendence of the Ego was published in 1936; Being and Nothingness in 1943.
- Husserl's Ideas I (1913) endorsed transcendental idealism and posits a transcendental ego within consciousness.