Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all and why are they ascribed to the same things to which we also ascribe physical properties? How does Strawson answer these questions in his work Individuals?
20 marks · directive: Explain
The core of a good answer
Strawson argues that states of consciousness can be ascribed at all only to things that also bear corporeal characteristics, because one can ascribe experiences to oneself only if one is prepared to ascribe them to others, and others can be picked out only within a spatial framework; the concept of a person, an entity to which both kinds of predicates apply, is therefore primitive, not a compound of a mind and a body.
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What the question asks
The question repeats Strawson's own two questions from Individuals (1959), chapter 3, Persons. The answer should give his framework (one subject for psychological and corporeal predicates), his arguments against the no-ownership and Cartesian views, and his conclusion, with a brief assessment.
Answer outline
Introduction
In Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959) Strawson asks why states of consciousness are ascribed to anything at all, and why to the very same things as corporeal characteristics.
Two kinds of predicates
- We ascribe to ourselves both corporeal characteristics and states of consciousness; persons are entities that bear both psychological and corporeal predicates.
- A necessary condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they be ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics.
Against the no-ownership view
- The no-ownership theorist holds that the ascription of states of consciousness to a self is a linguistic illusion: the first-person pronoun does not really refer.
- Strawson replies that to state the theory he must speak of 'my' experiences, so genuine self-reference reappears in it; without 'my' the claim becomes false or analytic rather than contingent.
Against the Cartesian view
- If the subject of experience were a pure ego, we could not identify or reidentify such subjects, and so could not distinguish one's own experiences from another's.
- One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others; others are identified through their bodies, so ascription requires bodily subjects.
The primitive concept of a person
- When we refer to ourselves we refer to one entity with physical and mental aspects, not to a mental thing paired with a physical one; the concept of a person is primitive.
- Because self-ascription requires other-ascription, the criteria for ascribing states to others must be logically adequate, so there is no genuine problem of other minds.
Conclusion
Strawson dissolves the mind-body problem's starting point: the person is basic, and minds are not separate things that bodies happen to carry. Critics ask whether calling the concept primitive explains or merely restates the unity.
Examples and data to cite
- Strawson counts Aristotle and Kant as descriptive metaphysicians, Descartes and Leibniz as revisionary.
- The pure ego: if subjects were pure egos, we could not distinguish one subject of ascription from another.
Facts to remember
- Individuals was published in 1959; Persons is its third chapter.
- Strawson called his project descriptive metaphysics, as opposed to revisionary metaphysics.