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2026 · Philosophy Optional Paper I · 20 marksMainsQuestion 3a

Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all and why are they ascribed to the same things to which we also ascribe physical properties? How does Strawson answer these questions in his work Individuals?

20 marks · directive: Explain

Answer

The core of a good answer

Strawson argues that states of consciousness can be ascribed at all only to things that also bear corporeal characteristics, because one can ascribe experiences to oneself only if one is prepared to ascribe them to others, and others can be picked out only within a spatial framework; the concept of a person, an entity to which both kinds of predicates apply, is therefore primitive, not a compound of a mind and a body.

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What the question asks

The question repeats Strawson's own two questions from Individuals (1959), chapter 3, Persons. The answer should give his framework (one subject for psychological and corporeal predicates), his arguments against the no-ownership and Cartesian views, and his conclusion, with a brief assessment.

Answer outline

Introduction

In Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959) Strawson asks why states of consciousness are ascribed to anything at all, and why to the very same things as corporeal characteristics.

Two kinds of predicates

Against the no-ownership view

Against the Cartesian view

The primitive concept of a person

Conclusion

Strawson dissolves the mind-body problem's starting point: the person is basic, and minds are not separate things that bodies happen to carry. Critics ask whether calling the concept primitive explains or merely restates the unity.

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