In what sense does St. Augustine’s identification of all evil as either sin or as the punishment of sin succeed or fail in providing a coherent account of both moral and natural evil ? Evaluate.
20 marks · directive: Evaluate
The core of a good answer
Augustine's formula succeeds for moral evil, which it traces to the free misuse of the will by creatures, and it gives a unified picture in which evil is a privation of good and suffering is just penalty; it fails for natural evil, because it ties earthquakes, disease and animal pain to a historical fall although natural disasters and disease existed before humans, makes innocent suffering 'punishment', and leaves unexplained how perfect creatures could fall.
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What the question asks
Evaluate asks for a judgement on coherence. Explain the theory (privation, free will, fall, punishment), show where it succeeds, then the main objections, especially on natural evil, and conclude.
Answer outline
Introduction
Augustine of Hippo (354 to 430) faced the problem of reconciling an omnipotent, wholly good Creator with evil. He held that evil has no positive nature but is the privation of good (City of God XI.9), and that all evil is either sin or the punishment of sin.
The theory
- God created everything good; evil is a lack or corruption of good, so God did not create evil.
- Moral evil (sin) arises from the free will of angels and humans turning from the higher good to lower goods.
- Natural evil (suffering, death, disorder in nature) entered as just punishment for the sin of Adam and Eve, inherited by all humans.
Where it succeeds
- Moral evil is plausibly explained by free will, an approach developed later by Plantinga's free will defence.
- Privation theory keeps God from being the author of evil and fits the idea of a good creation.
- It is unified: one source (misused freedom) for all evil.
Where it fails
- Natural evil before humans: the scientific consensus is that natural disasters and disease existed before humans, so they cannot be punishment for human sin.
- Innocent suffering: calling the suffering of children and animals punishment offends justice.
- Inherited guilt: collective punishment for Adam's sin conflicts with individual responsibility.
- John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966): it is incoherent that creatures made perfectly good, in a perfect world, should freely fall; and God, foreseeing the fall, bears responsibility.
- Privation does not ease the experience of pain, which is felt as positive.
Alternatives
- Hick's Irenaean, soul making theodicy treats the world as a place for moral growth.
Conclusion
Augustine's account is coherent as a theory of moral evil but fails as a complete account of natural evil; its reliance on a historical fall and inherited punishment is its weakest point.
Examples and data to cite
- Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966), named the 'Augustinian' and 'Irenaean' types of theodicy.
- Plantinga's free will defence (God, Freedom, and Evil, 1974) argues that God and evil are logically compatible.
Facts to remember
- Privatio boni: evil as the absence of good (City of God XI.9).
- Augustine lived 354 to 430.
- Moral evil is caused by agents; natural evil arises from natural processes.