Answer the following questions in about 150 words each :
What role does identity and technology play in the conceptualisation of Defensive realism ?
10 marks · answer in 150 words · directive: Explain
The core of a good answer
Technology enters defensive realism through the offence-defence balance and offence-defence distinguishability (Jervis), which decide how sharp the security dilemma is; identity and perception enter as modifiers, through perceived intentions (Walt's balance of threat) and through elite beliefs and domestic coalitions that explain why states overexpand, even though the structural core of the theory is anarchy, not identity.
An outline written by upsc.help, not an official UPSC answer; every fact checked by a separate review. How we work
What the question asks
The question asks how two variables fit into defensive realism. The answer should state the theory's core (anarchy pushes states to seek security, not maximum power), then show technology as a structural modifier and identity or perception as a unit-level modifier, ending with the theory's limits.
Answer outline
Introduction
Defensive realism (Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Van Evera, Charles Glaser, drawing on Jervis 1978 and Snyder 1991) holds that states seek to maintain their position rather than maximise power, and that 'international anarchy punishes aggression; it does not reward it' (Snyder).
Technology
- Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma' (1978): when defence has the advantage and defensive weapons can be told apart from offensive ones, status quo states can be secure without threatening others.
- Nuclear second-strike capability and geography (oceans, mountains) make conquest hard, so defence dominance is the normal condition.
- But equipment is neither purely defensive nor offensive, and the ambiguity grows as weapons become more sophisticated, which sharpens the security dilemma.
Identity and perception
- Walt's balance of threat: states respond to perceived aggressive intentions, not to power alone.
- Defensive neorealists hold that elite perceptions and beliefs are key to conflict, and that overexpansion follows when coalitions dominated by the military and expansionist groups prevail, as in Japan's expansion from the 1930s.
- Signalling matters because intentions can never be known with certainty.
Limits
- Mearsheimer calls the offence-defence argument 'close to being circular' and asks how an offensive advantage can be recognised.
Conclusion
Technology sets the material intensity of the security dilemma, while identity and perception decide how states read it; defensive realism admits both but keeps anarchy as the cause.
Examples and data to cite
- Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', 1978.
- Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, 1991.
- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979.
Facts to remember
- John Herz coined the term security dilemma (1951).
- Defensive realists generally see defence as having the advantage.