Pratidin
Polity and governance14 October 2026The Hindu, NationalGS2

Madras HC upholds AIADMK MLAs' resignations but says disqualification cases must go on

In one line: The Madras High Court has held that the Tamil Nadu Speaker rightly accepted six AIADMK MLAs' resignations, but that disqualification cases against them for defying the whip must still be decided within two months.

Published 14 October 2026. Written by Pratidin from the reports linked at the end; every fact checked by a separate review before publishing. How we work

On 13 October 2026, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, Chief Justice S.A. Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan, upheld Tamil Nadu Speaker J.C.D. Prabhakar's acceptance of the resignations of six MLAs elected on the AIADMK ticket who then joined the ruling Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK). The plea was filed by AIADMK whip Agri S.S. Krishnamurthy. The Court held that the resignations were genuine and voluntary and that the Speaker was not expected to conduct a detailed inquiry into the members' motives. It also held that resignation and disqualification are separate constitutional processes, so accepting the resignations did not make the pending disqualification proceedings academic. It directed the Speaker to decide those proceedings within two months.

The dispute began after the May 2026 Assembly election. TVK won 108 seats, ten short of the 118 needed for a majority. The AIADMK issued a whip to its members to vote against the government in the confidence motion on 13 May, but 25 AIADMK MLAs voted for the TVK government led by Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay, which won with 144 votes. Proceedings under the Tenth Schedule (the anti-defection law) began the next day; some MLAs apologised and the cases against them were dropped. The six MLAs later resigned, the Speaker accepted the resignations on the day they were submitted, and they joined TVK. Two of them, Maragatham Kumaravel and P. Sathyabama, have since won by-elections on TVK tickets.

The AIADMK argued that Article 190 required a real inquiry into whether the resignations were voluntary, that the same-day acceptance pointed to horse-trading, and that the party should have been heard. Senior Advocate C.S. Vaidyanathan argued that under Article 190(3)(b) the Speaker checks only whether a resignation is genuine, not why a member is leaving. Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy, for the MLAs, said resigning before joining another party can be a legitimate form of dissent. In its 2019 Karnataka MLAs judgment, the Supreme Court had held that the 'taint of disqualification' does not vanish when a member resigns. The outcome matters because a member disqualified under the Tenth Schedule cannot be appointed a minister or hold a remunerative political post for a period fixed by the Constitution.

Practise this in the app: flashcards, quiz and a timed answer
Prelims

Prelims facts

  • On 13 October 2026, the Madras High Court upheld the Tamil Nadu Speaker's acceptance of six AIADMK MLAs' resignations and directed him to decide pending disqualification cases within two months.
  • The Court held that resignation and disqualification are separate processes, and that the Speaker need not inquire into a member's motives for resigning.
  • Under the proviso to Article 190(3), added by the 33rd Amendment (1974), the Speaker must not accept a resignation that is not voluntary or genuine.
  • The Tenth Schedule was added by the 52nd Amendment (1985); Kihoto Hollohan (1992) made the Speaker's decisions under it subject to judicial review.
  • In Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil (2019), the Supreme Court held that resignation does not wipe out the taint of disqualification but that the Speaker cannot bar a disqualified member from contesting.

Quick recall

Bench that delivered the Madras HC ruling on 13 October 2026?
Chief Justice S.A. Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan.
How many AIADMK MLAs' resignations did the Court uphold?
Six.
Time given to the Speaker to decide the disqualification cases?
Two months.
Which amendment added the proviso on 'voluntary or genuine' resignations?
The 33rd Amendment, 1974.
Which amendment added the Tenth Schedule?
The 52nd Amendment, 1985.
Which amendment deleted the 'split' exception?
The 91st Amendment, 2003.
Which case made the Speaker's anti-defection decisions subject to judicial review?
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992).
Which Articles bar disqualified defectors from ministerial and remunerative political posts?
Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B.

Prelims practice question

With reference to the resignation of a member of a State Legislative Assembly, consider the following statements:
1. A member resigns by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker.
2. The Speaker must not accept the resignation if satisfied that it is not voluntary or genuine.
3. Once a resignation is accepted, pending disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule automatically lapse.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 1 and 2 only
  3. 2 and 3 only
  4. 1, 2 and 3
Show answer

Answer: (b) 1 and 2 only. Statements 1 and 2 restate Article 190(3)(b) and its proviso. Statement 3 is wrong: the Supreme Court in 2019 and the Madras High Court in October 2026 held that resignation does not end pending disqualification proceedings.

Use this in UPSC Mains: previous-year questions

Recurring theme: Anti-defection law, resignation and the role of the Speaker

  1. 2013 · GS2 · 10 marksCovers one partUse it in the example

    The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result, healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?

    How to use this

    Use the Tamil Nadu case to show how tightly the whip binds legislators, so that dissent now takes the form of resignation rather than debate.

    • 25 AIADMK MLAs defied the party whip in Tamil Nadu's confidence vote of 13 May 2026, triggering Tenth Schedule proceedings the next day.
    • Six of them resigned and joined TVK; the Madras High Court upheld the resignations on 13 October 2026.
    • Their counsel argued that resigning before joining another party is a legitimate form of dissent.
  2. 2020 · GS2 · 10 marksCovers one partUse it in the example

    'Once a speaker, Always a speaker'! Do you think the practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India.

    How to use this

    Cite the Tamil Nadu dispute to show why the Speaker's objectivity is contested in defection matters and why courts set deadlines.

    • The AIADMK alleged the Tamil Nadu Speaker accepted six resignations the same day without a real inquiry.
    • The Madras High Court upheld the acceptance but directed the Speaker to decide pending disqualification cases within two months.
    • Since Kihoto Hollohan (1992), Speakers' anti-defection decisions are open to judicial review.
Prelims
  1. 2014 · Prelims

    Which one of the following Schedules of the Constitution of India contains provisions regarding anti-defection? (a) Second Schedule (b) Fifth Schedule (c) Eighth Schedule (d) Tenth Schedule

Mains practice question

Resignation is increasingly used as a route around the anti-defection law. In the light of recent judicial rulings, examine whether the Tenth Schedule adequately addresses this practice. (250 words)

Model answer

On 13 October 2026, the Madras High Court upheld the Tamil Nadu Speaker's acceptance of six AIADMK MLAs' resignations but held that disqualification proceedings against them must still be decided, within two months.

What the law provides

  • Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985): a member is disqualified for voluntarily giving up party membership or voting against the party whip.
  • 91st Amendment (2003): removed the split exception and, through Articles 164(1B) and 361B, bars disqualified members from ministerial and remunerative political posts for a period.
  • Article 190(3)(b): the Speaker must not accept a resignation that is not voluntary or genuine.

How courts have handled resignation

  • Kihoto Hollohan (1992): Speaker's decisions are open to judicial review.
  • Karnataka MLAs case (2019): the 'taint of disqualification' does not vanish on resignation, but the Speaker cannot bar a member from contesting.

Gaps that remain

  • Members can resign, switch parties and return through by-elections; two of the six MLAs have already won on TVK tickets.
  • Disqualification decisions rest with a Speaker who belongs to a party, and delay can blunt the law; here the Court had to fix a two-month limit.

Way forward

  • Time-bound decisions on disqualification petitions as a rule, not case by case.
  • Decide pending disqualification alongside resignation, so penalties under Articles 164(1B) and 361B are not avoided.

The Tenth Schedule curbs open defection, but resignation-based switching shows it needs clearer timelines to keep faith with the voter's mandate.

The basics

Why this matters

India's anti-defection law was meant to stop legislators from switching sides for office or money after being elected on a party's ticket. Over time, a different route has appeared: resign the seat, join the new party, and contest again. The Madras High Court's ruling of 13 October 2026 shows how courts are handling this route.

Two different ways to lose a seat

Resignation versus disqualification
Resignation (Article 190(3)(b))
  • Member writes to the Speaker
  • Speaker checks it is voluntary and genuine
  • Seat falls vacant on acceptance
vs
Disqualification (Tenth Schedule)
  • Triggered by giving up party membership or defying the whip
  • Speaker decides on a petition
  • Bars ministerial and remunerative political posts for a period

Both end with a vacant seat, but only disqualification carries extra penalties. That is why parties keep pressing disqualification cases even after a member has resigned, and why courts have held that the two processes run separately. The resignation rule is explained in Article 190 and resignation, and the defection rule in Tenth Schedule.

How the law developed

Milestones in the law on resignation and defection
  1. 197433rd Amendment: Speaker must reject resignations that are not voluntary or genuine
  2. 198552nd Amendment adds the Tenth Schedule
  3. 1992Kihoto Hollohan: Speaker's decisions open to judicial review
  4. 200391st Amendment removes the split exception; bars on office for defectors
  5. 13 November 2019Karnataka MLAs case: resignation does not erase the taint of disqualification
  6. 13 October 2026Madras HC: resignations upheld, disqualification to be decided in two months

The Tamil Nadu sequence

From cross-voting to the High Court
  1. 1Hung verdictTVK wins 108 seats, ten short of the 118 needed
  2. 2Confidence vote, 13 May25 AIADMK MLAs defy the whip; TVK government wins with 144 votes
  3. 3Disqualification beginsTenth Schedule proceedings start; some dropped after apologies
  4. 4ResignationsSix MLAs resign; the Speaker accepts the same day and they join TVK
  5. 5Court rulingResignations upheld; disqualification to be decided within two months

The key precedent is the Karnataka MLAs case (2019), and the Speaker's position is discussed in Kihoto Hollohan judgment (1992).

Go deeper

Why it matters for UPSC

The anti-defection law, the Speaker's role and judicial review are standard GS2 topics, and Prelims has asked which Schedule contains the anti-defection law. This ruling adds a fresh example of how resignation and disqualification interact.

The core idea

A legislator can lose a seat in two ways. Under Article 190 and resignation, a member resigns and the Speaker accepts if the resignation is voluntary and genuine. Under the Tenth Schedule, a member is disqualified for giving up party membership or defying the whip. The Karnataka MLAs case (2019) held that resigning does not erase the taint of defection. Since the Kihoto Hollohan judgment (1992), the Speaker's decisions in such cases can be reviewed by courts, which is how the AIADMK came to the High Court.

Numbers and dates to remember

  • 13 May 2026: confidence vote; 25 AIADMK MLAs vote for the TVK government, which wins with 144 votes.
  • TVK seats: 108; majority mark: 118.
  • 6 MLAs resigned and joined TVK; 2 have won by-elections.
  • 13 October 2026: Madras HC ruling; Speaker given 2 months.
  • 1974 (33rd), 1985 (52nd), 2003 (91st): key amendments.

Where to go next

Go deeper: is resignation a loophole?

One view, put to the court by Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy for the MLAs, is that resigning before joining another party is a legitimate form of dissent. The member gives up the seat and goes back to the voters, which is more honest than switching sides while keeping the seat. Senior Advocate C.S. Vaidyanathan argued that under Article 190 and resignation, the Speaker must only check that the resignation is genuine and voluntary, not the reasons behind it, and the High Court agreed.

The other view, pressed by the AIADMK, is that resignation can be used to sidestep the Tenth Schedule. Members defy the whip on a confidence vote, resign before they can be disqualified, join the ruling party and return through by-elections. Here, two of the six MLAs have already won by-elections on TVK tickets. The AIADMK said the same-day acceptance pointed to horse-trading, an allegation the court did not accept.

The courts have tried to close part of the gap. In the Karnataka MLAs case (2019), the Supreme Court said the 'taint of disqualification does not vaporise' on resignation, so a Speaker can still decide disqualification for acts done before resigning. But it also held that the Speaker cannot bar a disqualified member from contesting until the end of the term. The penalty that remains is the bar under Articles 164(1B) and 361B on ministerial and remunerative political posts. The Madras ruling follows this line and adds a two-month deadline, showing how the review power recognised in the Kihoto Hollohan judgment (1992) is used to keep Speakers from sitting on petitions.

Article 190 and resignation

How a legislator resigns and what the Speaker must check.

In one line: Article 190(3)(b) lets a State legislator resign by writing to the Speaker, and the seat falls vacant once the resignation is accepted.

The proviso

The Constitution (Thirty-third Amendment) Act, 1974 added a proviso: if, from information received or otherwise and after such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Speaker is satisfied that the resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept it.

Why it is in the news

The AIADMK argued that the Tamil Nadu Speaker accepted six resignations too quickly. The Madras High Court held that the Speaker checks whether a resignation is genuine and voluntary, and need not conduct a detailed inquiry into the member's motives.

Where to go next

Tenth Schedule

The anti-defection law that the disqualification cases rest on.

In one line: The Tenth Schedule, added by the 52nd Amendment in 1985, disqualifies legislators who defect from the party on whose ticket they were elected.

Grounds and exceptions

A member is disqualified if he voluntarily gives up membership of his party, or votes or abstains contrary to the party's direction. A merger supported by two-thirds of the legislature party is exempt. The 91st Amendment (2003) deleted the earlier exception for a split by one-third of members.

Consequences

The 91st Amendment also inserted Articles 75(1B), 164(1B) and 361B. A disqualified member cannot be a minister or hold a remunerative political post until the term would have ended or until re-elected, whichever is earlier.

Where to go next

Karnataka MLAs case (2019)

The precedent that resignation does not end disqualification.

In one line: In Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly (13 November 2019), the Supreme Court upheld the disqualification of 17 MLAs who had resigned, but allowed them to contest by-elections.

What the Court held

A three-judge Bench (Justices N.V. Ramana, Sanjiv Khanna and Krishna Murari) said the "factum and taint of disqualification does not vaporise by tendering a resignation letter to the Speaker". A pending disqualification petition does not become pointless if the disqualifying acts happened before the resignation. But the Speaker had no power to bar the members from contesting until the end of the Assembly's term, so that part of the orders was set aside.

Why it is in the news

The Madras High Court's October 2026 ruling follows the same logic: it upheld the six resignations but said the disqualification proceedings must still be decided.

Where to go next

Kihoto Hollohan judgment (1992)

Why courts can review a Speaker's decisions on defection.

In one line: In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court held that the Speaker's decisions under the anti-defection law are open to judicial review.

What it decided

Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule had tried to bar courts from examining disqualification matters. The Court declared that bar unconstitutional and held that the Speaker's decisions can be reviewed under Articles 32 and 226.

Why it is in the news

Because of this review power, the AIADMK could challenge the Tamil Nadu Speaker's acceptance of resignations in the Madras High Court, and the Court could direct the Speaker to decide the pending disqualification petitions within two months.

Where to go next

Syllabus

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