"BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South." Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.

Use the unreformed, P5-dominated Security Council as backdrop for the Global South's search for other platforms, but do not present it as direct evidence on BRICS.

• Critics argue the UN Security Council still reflects the power structure of 1945; its structure has not changed since 1965, when non-permanent seats rose from six to ten.
• The Council has no permanent member from Africa or Latin America, and India, with about a sixth of humanity, remains outside it.
• Vetoes have blocked Council action on Syria, Ukraine and Gaza, where mass atrocities were alleged, and P5 members can shield themselves and allies from accountability.

Gives a concrete financial example of BRICS seeking alternatives to Western-run payment plumbing, and of the limits of that effort.

• BRICS countries have discussed a BRICS Pay system linking national payment platforms, alongside Russia's SPFS (2014) and China's CIPS (2015).
• China's CIPS processed about RMB 175 trillion in 2024, yet no alternative comes close to SWIFT's reach of over 11,000 institutions in more than 200 countries.
• Network effects, the dollar's dominance and banks' fear of secondary sanctions limit these alternatives; argue that interoperable rupee links suit India better than a bloc-based system.

Use BRICS payment initiatives as a concrete way the group tries to offer alternatives to existing financial arrangements, while noting India frames them as efficiency, not opposition.

• The Kazan Declaration (October 2024) welcomed local currency settlement among members and agreed to study BRICS Clear, an independent cross-border settlement and depository system.
• Ahead of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi (12 and 13 September 2026), the RBI recommended linking members' CBDCs; reports say the talks are not targeted against any other country.
• Limits: CBDCs are little used, trade imbalances would need currency swap arrangements, and political frictions in an expanded bloc hinder deep integration.

Use the op-ed to assess whether BRICS is an alternative voice for emerging economies or drifting into an anti-West bloc, and what India's 2026 chairship seeks.

• BRICS has grown from five to eleven members, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joining in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025, plus ten partner countries.
• Former Sherpa T.S. Tirumurti argues China has steered BRICS from institutional reform towards a counterpoise to the West, and India wants a 'non-West', not 'anti-West', platform.
• Concrete results include the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (Fortaleza, 2014); sceptics say the lack of a charter or permanent secretariat limits BRICS.

The New Delhi Declaration is fresh evidence of BRICS pressing for reform of the UN, IMF and WTO on behalf of the Global South, while its vague consensus shows the limits.

• The 18th BRICS summit (New Delhi, 12 to 13 September 2026) adopted a 140-paragraph declaration by consensus among 11 members, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the UAE.
• It urged IMF quota increases under the 16th General Review 'with no further delay', sought restoration of a two-tier WTO dispute settlement mechanism and opposed carbon border adjustment mechanisms.
• Limits: West Asia language had to balance Iran and the UAE, and China's support for India's UN role (para 13) repeats earlier text without naming permanent seats.

The NDB is BRICS's clearest institutional alternative, though its slow disbursement and Russia problem limit how far BRICS can act as a counterweight.

• An op-ed notes BRICS accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP, yet its members' IMF voting share has not changed, which drives the search for alternatives.
• The op-ed argues local-currency lending (a 30% target) and Panda bonds (94.5 billion yuan in total) cut exchange-rate risk and dollar dependence, a quieter route than a common BRICS currency.
• Limits: new transactions with Russia on hold since March 2022, equal founder shares complicating capital expansion, and only ten members including Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria and Uzbekistan.