What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?

Shows India's bilateral response to a protectionist world and the new non-tariff challenges, such as CBAM, that come with it.

• India and the EU will sign their FTA on 16 December 2026; the EU will remove tariffs on 99.5% of items from India, and India offers concessions on 97.5% of trade value.
• The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on steel and aluminium could offset tariff gains, and EU standards act as non-tariff barriers for MSMEs.
• Way forward: help MSMEs meet EU standards through testing labs, and negotiate CBAM credit for India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme.

Shows India's own use of non-tariff barriers and their costs, a self-inflicted challenge in a protectionist world.

• Quality Control Orders under the BIS Act, 2016 make BIS certification mandatory before a product can be made, imported or sold; their number rose sharply after 2020.
• A September 2025 CSEP study found QCOs suppressed imports of intermediate goods without any significant improvement in exports.
• Note that QCOs are seen as protectionism that invites retaliation and conflicts with FTA commitments.

Shows how India uses bilateral deals to win market access while shielding sensitive sectors in a protectionist world.

• Since leaving RCEP in 2019, India has signed deals with the UAE and Australia (2022), EFTA (2024), the UK and New Zealand, and the EU (signing December 2026).
• India kept dairy entirely out of the NZ deal along with sugar, onions, chickpeas, spices and edible oils; apples, kiwifruit and honey get only tariff-rate quotas.
• The deal covers 118 services sectors and offers 5,000 temporary employment visas for Indian professionals and 1,000 working holiday visas a year.

Use carbon border taxes as a new trade barrier, and India's carbon market recognition as one way of meeting it.

• The UK CBAM, starting 1 January 2027, charges imports of aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen, and iron and steel for embedded emissions; the EU's CBAM became definitive on 1 January 2026.
• India has criticised carbon border taxes, especially the EU's, as unilateral trade measures at odds with common but differentiated responsibilities.
• UK recognition of India's CCTS lets importers claim relief for carbon priced in India; supporters argue a credible domestic carbon price keeps that money in India.

The U.S.-Canada rupture shows that even deep integration offers no protection under protectionism, and the editorial draws hedging and diversification lessons for India.

• Despite free trade since the 1965 Auto Pact and NAFTA (1994), Canada has imposed reciprocal tariffs of up to 50% on U.S. imports, and the U.S. declined on 1 July 2026 to renew the USMCA.
• The editorial notes India accepted an 18% tariff arrangement with the U.S. in February 2026, followed by U.S. probes into forced labour and excess capacity.
• Lessons for India: diversify markets through the India-UK trade pact and talks with the EU, build review and dispute clauses, keep red lines on dairy and agriculture, and back multilateral rules.

Tighter U.S. work-visa rules show protectionism extending to the mobility of professionals, a challenge for India's services economy; follow with suggested responses.

• On 11 September 2026 the U.S. DHS proposed ending the up-to-60-day grace period for laid-off H-1B, L-1, O-1 and other workers; comments close on 10 November 2026.
• It follows a September 2025 proclamation imposing a one-time $100,000 fee on H-1B applications filed between 21 September 2025 and 21 September 2026; Indian outsourcing firms are leading H-1B users.
• Responses: seek mobility provisions in trade agreements, raise the issue in bilateral talks, and expand global capability centres and remote delivery so less work depends on visas.

The India-EU FTA shows India turning to bilateral deals while guarding sensitive sectors through quotas, and CBAM shows the protectionist pressures its exporters still face.

• The India-EU FTA, concluded on 27 January 2026, cuts or removes tariffs on 96.6% of EU goods exports to India, per the Commission; it was presented to the EU Council on 11 September 2026.
• India's tariff of up to 110% on EU cars falls to 10% only within a 2,50,000-vehicle quota, with first-year concessions only for cars above €15,000, shielding the mass market.
• Indian steel gets only a 1.64 mt quota against exports of about 4 mt and faces CBAM (definitive since 1 January 2026); ICRIER suggests a shift to higher value-added steel.

Gives a services-side example of protectionism hitting India, with its measurable effects and India's possible responses.

• A US proclamation of 18 September 2026 extends the $100,000 H-1B payment requirement until 21 September 2027, and a companion order makes agencies weigh employers' layoffs.
• The largest IT staffing and outsourcing firms cut combined H-1B registrations from 24,946 to 2,055, a 92% fall, according to the proclamation.
• Suggest raising mobility in trade talks, seeking totalisation of social security and diversifying destinations to Europe and East Asia.

Use India-US tariff swings to illustrate the challenges of protectionism and the op-ed's proposals as ways to meet them.

• US duties on many Indian goods rose towards 50% in August 2025, then fell to an 18% reciprocal rate under the February 2026 interim framework.
• The US Supreme Court struck down IEEPA tariffs in February 2026, but Sections 232, 301 and 122 still allow new duties.
• India can seek a binding tariff ceiling, non-discrimination, prior consultation and snap-back clauses in bilateral deals.