Op-ed: Falling fertility, delimitation and the politics of population
Fertility is falling in every community, yet leaders call for more babies. Why do seats in Parliament hang on it?
Published 1 September 2026. Written by Pratidin from the reports linked at the end; every fact checked by a separate review before publishing. How we work
A lead article in The Hindu, 'Political demography, the future of democracy', argues that demographic change should neither be ignored nor politically exploited. It notes that India's total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children a woman would have at current birth rates, has fallen to 2.0 in the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019-21), below the replacement level of about 2.1. The fall has been seen in every major religious community. NFHS data show Muslim fertility falling from 4.41 in 1992-93 to 2.36 in 2019-21, and Hindu fertility from 3.3 to 1.94. The article argues that fertility choices are shaped by factors such as housing costs, employment security, education, gender relations and childcare responsibilities, and that demographic change should be read through development indicators rather than as religious competition.

The political stakes come from the link between population and seats. Article 81 requires the ratio of Lok Sabha seats to population to be, as far as practicable, the same for all States. To avoid penalising States that controlled population growth, the 42nd Amendment (1976) froze seat allocation on the 1971 census, and the 84th Amendment (2001) extended the freeze until the first census taken after 2026. With Census 2027 under way, a fresh allocation could shift seats from southern States, which reached low fertility early and are ageing faster, to younger, more populous northern States.
The article cautions that a purely numerical approach to representation could create tension between States, and that calls by public figures for larger families risk turning fertility into a contest. It notes that countries such as Japan, South Korea and Italy have introduced incentives, yet none has consistently restored fertility to earlier levels. It urges policymakers to focus on ageing, migration, job creation and regional inequality. The counter-view in the delimitation debate is that the freeze leaves voters in fast-growing States under-represented, weakening the principle of equal value for each vote.
Prelims facts
- India's total fertility rate was 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019-21), below the replacement level of about 2.1.
- Fertility has fallen in all major communities: Muslim TFR from 4.41 (1992-93) to 2.36, Hindu TFR from 3.3 to 1.94.
- The 42nd Amendment (1976) froze inter-State seat allocation on the 1971 census; the 84th Amendment (2001) extended it until the first census after 2026.
- Article 81 seeks the same ratio of Lok Sabha seats to population for all States, as far as practicable.
- The op-ed argues pronatalist incentives abroad have not restored fertility and urges focus on ageing, migration and jobs.
Quick recall
- Define total fertility rate.
- Average live births a woman would have by the end of her child-bearing years at current age-specific birth rates
- India's TFR in NFHS-5 (2019-21)?
- 2.0
- Replacement level fertility?
- About 2.1 children per woman
- Muslim TFR in NFHS-1 and NFHS-5?
- 4.41 (1992-93) and 2.36 (2019-21)
- Which amendment first froze inter-State seat allocation?
- 42nd Amendment (1976), on the 1971 census
- Until when does the 84th Amendment extend the freeze?
- Until the first census taken after 2026
- Which articles provide for readjustment after each census?
- Article 82 (Lok Sabha) and Article 170 (State Assemblies)
- What did the 87th Amendment (2003) allow?
- Redrawing constituency boundaries on the 2001 census without changing seat totals
Prelims practice question
With reference to the delimitation of constituencies in India, consider the following statements:
1. The 42nd Amendment froze the allocation of Lok Sabha seats among States on the basis of the 1971 census.
2. The 84th Amendment extended this freeze until the first census taken after 2026.
3. The 87th Amendment increased the number of Lok Sabha seats on the basis of the 2001 census.
Which of the statements given above are correct?
- 1 and 2 only
- 2 and 3 only
- 1 and 3 only
- 1, 2 and 3
Show answer
Answer: (a) 1 and 2 only. Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is incorrect: the 87th Amendment (2003) allowed constituency boundaries to be readjusted on the basis of the 2001 census; it did not change the number of seats, which remains based on the 1971 census.
Use this in UPSC Mains: previous-year questions
Recurring theme: Demographic transition, fertility decline and its political consequences in India
Critically examine the challenges of demographic transition in contemporary India.
How to use thisUse the op-ed to set out the main challenges of uneven demographic transition: representation, federal fairness, ageing and communal framing of fertility.
- India's TFR fell to 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019-21), below replacement of about 2.1; it has fallen in every community, Muslim from 4.41 (1992-93) to 2.36 and Hindu from 3.3 to 1.94.
- Seat allocation is frozen on the 1971 census (42nd Amendment, 1976; extended by the 84th Amendment, 2001, until the first census after 2026), so Census 2027 could shift seats northwards.
- The op-ed urges policy to focus on ageing, migration, job creation and regional inequality rather than treating fertility as religious competition.
- How to use this
Use the op-ed's examples to show that sub-replacement fertility is spreading and that pronatalist incentives have not reversed it.
- The op-ed notes Japan, South Korea and Italy introduced incentives, yet none has consistently restored fertility to earlier levels.
- India's own TFR fell to 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019-21), below the replacement level of about 2.1, with southern States ageing faster.
- It argues fertility choices are shaped by housing costs, employment security, education, gender relations and childcare responsibilities.
The op-ed's core statistic is the total fertility rate; this question tests its exact definition.
Mains practice question
India's fertility decline has been uneven across States. Discuss its implications for political representation and federal balance, and suggest a way forward. (250 words)
Model answer
India's total fertility rate fell to 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019-21), below the replacement level of about 2.1, but States have moved through the demographic transition at different speeds. This creates political, federal and economic challenges.
Challenges
- Representation: Lok Sabha seats are allotted on the 1971 census under the 42nd and 84th Amendments; after the first census after 2026, seats could shift from low-fertility to high-fertility States.
- Federal fairness: States that met national population goals early fear losing political weight while contributing a large share of central taxes.
- Ageing: early-transition States face rising elderly shares, pension and health costs.
- Dividend at risk: younger States need jobs, skills and health care to turn a large workforce into growth.
- Migration: internal migrants shift population between States, complicating seat counts and resource sharing.
- Communal framing: fertility is often wrongly linked to religion, though it has fallen in every community (Muslim TFR 4.41 in 1992-93 to 2.36; Hindu 3.3 to 1.94).
Way forward
- Delimitation design: consider a larger House so no State loses seats, or weigh factors beyond population, after wide consultation.
- Development focus: invest in education, women's work and health in high-fertility States, the proven drivers of fertility decline.
- Ageing policy: strengthen pensions, geriatric care and the silver economy.
- Avoid pronatalist races: incentives in Japan, South Korea and Italy have not restored fertility.
- Data: use Census 2027 to plan for migration and ageing.
India's demographic diversity calls for policy that treats population as a matter of development and federal fairness, not a contest of numbers.
The basics
Why this matters
India's fertility has fallen below the level needed to replace each generation. The fall has been uneven: some States have fewer young people and more elderly, others are still young. Because seats in Parliament are tied to population, these differences turn into a political question when the freeze on seat allocation ends after the first census taken after 2026. A lead article in The Hindu on 1 September 2026 argues that demographic change should not become a contest between communities or regions. The basics are fertility, the demographic transition, the delimitation freeze and what pronatalist policies can do.
Fertility in one number
The Total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children a woman would have over her child-bearing years at current rates. About 2.1 is the replacement level, at which a population stabilises in the long run, leaving aside migration.
The demographic transition
Societies move through a Demographic transition: first death rates fall, then birth rates follow as education, incomes, urbanisation and health care improve. The op-ed argues that India's fertility decline should be read through such development indicators rather than as religious competition.
- 1High birth, high deathPopulation grows slowly because many children die young
- 2Death rates fallBetter health and food cut mortality; population grows fast
- 3Birth rates fallEducation, jobs for women and urban life lower desired family size
- 4Low birth, low deathPopulation stabilises; the share of the elderly rises
Seats and the freeze
Article 81 requires that seats in the Lok Sabha be allotted to States so that the ratio between seats and population is, as far as practicable, the same for all States. Article 82 provides for readjustment after each census. To avoid penalising States that controlled population growth, allocation has been frozen on the 1971 census; see Delimitation and the seat freeze.
- 197642nd Amendment freezes inter-State allocation of seats on the 1971 census until the first census after 2000
- 200184th Amendment extends the freeze until the first census taken after 2026
- 200387th Amendment lets constituency boundaries be redrawn on the 2001 census, without changing seat totals
- 2027Census 2027, the first census after 2026, reopens the question
Some governments try to raise births with cash and leave; the record of such Pronatalist policies abroad is weak.
Go deeper
In one line: A lead article argues that India's falling and uneven fertility, which will shape seat allocation after the post-2026 census, should be handled through development and fair federal design, not through competition to have more children.
Why it matters for UPSC
This joins GS1 (population, demographic transition, regionalism) with GS2 (Parliament, delimitation, federalism). Recent Mains papers asked about the challenges of India's demographic transition and about 'demographic winter'; Prelims asked for the definition of the total fertility rate.
The core idea
India's Total fertility rate is 2.0, below replacement, and falling across all communities, as the Demographic transition predicts. States moved at different speeds, so they now differ in age structure. When the Delimitation and the seat freeze ends after the first census taken after 2026, seats could shift from low-fertility to high-fertility States. Some leaders have urged larger families, but the record of Pronatalist policies in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Italy suggests incentives do not restore high fertility.
Numbers and dates to remember
- NFHS-5 (2019-21) TFR: 2.0; replacement level about 2.1
- Muslim TFR: 4.41 (NFHS-1, 1992-93) to 2.36 (NFHS-5); Hindu TFR: 3.3 to 1.94
- Lok Sabha seats: 543, inter-State allocation based on the 1971 census
- 42nd Amendment (1976): freeze until the first census after 2000
- 84th Amendment (2001): freeze until the first census after 2026
- Articles 81, 82 (Lok Sabha) and 170 (State Assemblies)
Where to go next
- Total fertility rate: the key measure and what replacement level means
- Demographic transition: why fertility falls as societies develop
- Delimitation and the seat freeze: how population and seats are linked
- Pronatalist policies: what incentives for more births have achieved abroad
Go deeper: numbers, representation and fairness
The op-ed's argument. Fertility has fallen in every major religious community, and the article argues that demographic change should be read through development indicators rather than as religious competition. It notes that countries such as Japan, South Korea, China and Italy introduced incentives, yet none has consistently restored fertility to earlier levels. The article cautions that a purely numerical approach to representation could set States against each other, and urges policy to focus on ageing, migration, jobs and regional inequality rather than on who has more people.
The equality argument. Article 81 aims at equal representation per person. Supporters of delimitation on current population say the freeze has left voters in fast-growing States under-represented, since a seat there covers far more people than in slow-growing States. Holding the 1971 allocation indefinitely, they argue, weakens the principle of one person, one vote. See Delimitation and the seat freeze.
The federal argument. States that brought their Total fertility rate down early, largely in the south, argue they should not lose political weight for succeeding at a national goal. They also point out that they contribute a large share of central taxes. Options discussed in public debate include extending the freeze, raising the total number of seats so no State loses, or giving weight to factors other than population.
The ageing question. Uneven progress through the Demographic transition means some States face ageing and pension costs while others still need jobs for a young workforce. Internal migration moves workers between them, which complicates both representation and the sharing of resources.
Why pronatalism is a weak answer. The evidence from Pronatalist policies abroad is that incentives slow the decline at best. Turning fertility into a contest between communities or regions risks antagonism without changing the numbers much.
Total fertility rate
The key measure and what replacement level means
In one line: The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of live births a woman would have by the end of her child-bearing years if current age-specific birth rates held.
The idea from zero
TFR is a synthetic measure: it adds up this year's birth rates for women of each age, from about 15 to 49. A TFR of about 2.1 is replacement level: each couple is replaced by two children, with a small margin for deaths before adulthood. Below this, a population eventually shrinks unless migration makes up the gap, though it keeps growing for a while because of the large number of young people already born.
Why it is in the news
India's TFR was 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019-21). Fertility has fallen across communities: among Muslims from 4.41 in 1992-93 to 2.36, and among Hindus from 3.3 to 1.94.
Where to go next
Demographic transition
Why fertility falls as societies develop
In one line: The demographic transition is the shift from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates as a society develops.
The idea from zero
First, better food, sanitation and health care cut deaths, especially of children, so population grows fast. Then, as education spreads, women join paid work, cities grow and child survival becomes assured, families choose fewer children and birth rates fall. At the end, population stabilises and the share of older people rises. A country passing through the middle stages has a large working-age population, the 'demographic dividend', if it can create jobs.
Why it is in the news
Indian States are at different stages. Those that went through the transition early now face ageing, while others remain young. The op-ed argues that the decline in fertility across communities should be read through development indicators rather than as religious competition.
Where to go next
Delimitation and the seat freeze
How population and seats are linked
In one line: Delimitation is the fixing of the number of seats per State and of constituency boundaries on the basis of census population; inter-State seat allocation has been frozen on the 1971 census.
The constitutional frame
Article 81 requires the ratio of Lok Sabha seats to population to be, as far as practicable, the same for all States. Article 82 (Lok Sabha) and Article 170 (State Assemblies) provide for readjustment after each census, done by a Delimitation Commission set up by law. The 42nd Amendment (1976) froze allocations on the 1971 census until the first census after 2000, so that States controlling population growth were not penalised. The 84th Amendment (2001) extended this until the first census taken after 2026. The 87th Amendment (2003) allowed boundaries to be redrawn on the 2001 census without changing seat totals.
Why it is in the news
Census 2027 will be the first after 2026, reopening the question of how seats are shared.
Where to go next
Pronatalist policies
What incentives for more births have achieved abroad
In one line: Pronatalist policies try to raise birth rates through cash payments, tax breaks, longer parental leave, childcare and housing support.
The record
Countries with very low fertility, such as Japan, South Korea and Italy, have spent heavily on such measures. Fertility in these countries has stayed well below replacement; South Korea's is among the lowest in the world, below one child per woman. The op-ed points out that fertility decisions depend on housing costs, employment security, education, gender relations, childcare responsibilities and confidence in the future.
Why it is in the news
The op-ed notes calls in India for larger families and argues that none of the countries that introduced incentives has consistently restored fertility to earlier levels. It urges policy to prepare for ageing and migration instead.
Where to go next
Take the 1 September 2026 quiz: 30 Prelims-style questions with answers