Make in India turns 12 with a patchy scorecard
Output grew. Did manufacturing's share of jobs and exports?
Published 25 September 2026. Written by Pratidin from the reports linked at the end; every fact checked by a separate review before publishing. How we work
Make in India, launched on 25 September 2014, completed 12 years with assessments showing output gains but no structural shift. Under the revised national accounts series, manufacturing gross value added grew at a compound annual rate of about 10.9% between 2022-23 and 2025-26, and the manufacturing index of industrial production grew 7.0% in April to July 2026 over a year earlier.
The weaker side is trade and jobs. Non-petroleum goods exports rose about 53% over the 12 years, from $253.5 billion in 2014-15 to $388.3 billion in 2025-26, a much slower pace than in the preceding 12 years, though from a larger base. Manufacturing's share of GDP and employment has stayed close to its 2014 level, well short of the original 25% target.
On the policy side, Make in India 2.0 covers 27 sectors, 15 of them in manufacturing. PLI schemes had attracted more than ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment by March 2026, and in July 2026 the Cabinet approved a ₹62,500 crore Mobile Phone Manufacturing Scheme for 2026-27 to 2030-31 to move the sector from assembly to component manufacturing.
Prelims facts
- Make in India was launched on 25 September 2014 to make India a global manufacturing hub.
- Supporting measures include PLI schemes, PM GatiShakti, the National Single Window System and FDI liberalisation.
- The original target was a 25% share of manufacturing in GDP; the share has stayed close to its 2014 level.
Quick recall
- When was Make in India launched?
- On 25 September 2014.
- What was Make in India's original manufacturing share target?
- 25% of GDP.
- How fast did manufacturing GVA grow from 2022-23 to 2025-26?
- About 10.9% a year (compound), under the revised national accounts series.
- How much did non-petroleum goods exports grow in 12 years of Make in India?
- About 53%, from $253.5 billion (2014-15) to $388.3 billion (2025-26).
- How many sectors does Make in India 2.0 cover?
- 27 sectors, 15 of them in manufacturing.
- How much investment had PLI schemes attracted by March 2026?
- More than ₹2.40 lakh crore.
- What is the Mobile Phone Manufacturing Scheme approved in July 2026?
- A ₹62,500 crore scheme for 2026-27 to 2030-31 to move from assembly to component manufacturing.
- Name three supporting reforms of Make in India.
- PLI schemes, PM GatiShakti and the National Single Window System (also FDI liberalisation).
Prelims practice question
Make in India was launched in which year?
- 2012
- 2014
- 2016
- 2019
Show answer
Answer: (b) 2014. It was launched on 25 September 2014, which is why the 12-year assessments appeared on 25 September 2026.
Use this in UPSC Mains: previous-year questions
Recurring theme: Manufacturing-led growth, industrial policy and job creation
- How to use this
Use the 12-year scorecard to assess PLI's achievements in investment and electronics, its weakness on jobs and value addition, and the improvements needed.
- PLI schemes had attracted more than ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment by March 2026 and turned India into a major mobile phone exporter.
- Gaps: PLI favours large, automated units, so output rises faster than jobs, and domestic value addition in electronics remains low, with components imported.
- Improvement under way: a ₹62,500 crore Mobile Phone Manufacturing Scheme (July 2026, for 2026-27 to 2030-31) to move from assembly to components; incentives could shift to apparel, footwear and food processing.
- How to use this
Use it to show that present policies have raised manufacturing output but not its share of GDP, and that input costs weigh on MSMEs.
- Make in India (launched 25 September 2014) targeted a 25% manufacturing share of GDP; the share has stayed close to its 2014 level.
- Manufacturing GVA grew at about 10.9% a year from 2022-23 to 2025-26 under the revised series, and manufacturing IIP grew 7.0% in April to July 2026.
- High logistics costs, tariff increases on inputs and Quality Control Orders raise costs for downstream MSMEs; supporting measures include PLI, PM GatiShakti and the National Single Window System.
- How to use this
Use the Make in India record to show capital-intensive growth and slower export expansion, and to propose measures favouring labour-intensive exports.
- Non-petroleum goods exports rose about 53% in 12 years, from $253.5 billion (2014-15) to $388.3 billion (2025-26), a much slower pace than in the preceding 12 years.
- PLI favours large, automated units, so output rises faster than jobs; in electronics, domestic value addition is still low and components are imported.
- Measures: shift incentives to apparel, footwear and food processing, lower tariffs on intermediate goods, rationalise QCOs and build plug-and-play industrial parks.
- How to use this
Use the 12-year record to argue that missing labour and factor market reforms help explain why Make in India has not shifted workers to manufacturing.
- Manufacturing's share of GDP and employment has stayed close to its 2014 level, well short of the 25% target.
- Rigid land, labour and power markets slow new labour-intensive units; suggested remedies are implementing the Labour Codes with safeguards and plug-and-play industrial parks with skilled workforce pools.
- How to use this
Use Make in India's record to show that the policy attempt to build a stronger industrial base has raised output but not industry's structural share.
- Twelve years after its launch, manufacturing's share of GDP and employment is close to its 2014 level; the shift of workers from farms to factories has not happened at scale.
- Output has grown: manufacturing GVA rose about 10.9% a year from 2022-23 to 2025-26, and PLI drew over ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment by March 2026.
Mains practice question
Twelve years after Make in India, manufacturing output has grown but its share in jobs and GDP has not changed much. Examine the reasons and suggest measures. (250 words)
Model answer
Make in India (2014) aimed to raise manufacturing to 25% of GDP and create 100 million manufacturing jobs. Twelve years on, output and investment have grown, but the structural shift of workers from farms to factories has not happened at scale.
What has worked
- Revised national accounts show manufacturing GVA growing at about 10.9% a year from 2022-23 to 2025-26.
- PLI schemes drew significant investment and turned India into a major mobile phone exporter.
- Logistics (GatiShakti), the single window and FDI reforms improved the ease of setting up.
Why the share has not moved
- Capital-intensive growth: PLI favours large, automated units, so output rises faster than jobs.
- Assembly over depth: domestic value addition in electronics is still low; components are imported.
- Cost of inputs: high logistics costs, tariff increases on inputs and Quality Control Orders raise costs for downstream MSMEs.
- Land, labour and power: rigid factor markets and costly power slow new labour-intensive units.
- Exports: non-petroleum exports grew about 53% in 12 years, slower than in the previous 12, as global trade weakened.
Measures
- Shift incentives to labour-intensive sectors such as apparel, footwear and food processing.
- Component ecosystems and supplier parks around anchor firms.
- Lower tariffs on intermediate goods and rationalise QCOs.
- Implement the Labour Codes with safeguards; build plug-and-play industrial parks with skilled workforce pools.
Make in India has built capacity. The next phase must be judged by jobs and domestic value addition, not by output alone.
The basics
Why this matters
In 2014, India set out to make manufacturing the engine of jobs, aiming to lift its share of GDP to 25%. Twelve years later, output has grown and investment has flowed into sectors such as mobile phones, but manufacturing's share of jobs and GDP has barely changed. Understanding why is central to India's growth story.
What the scorecard shows
Revised national accounts show manufacturing gross value added growing about 10.9% a year between 2022-23 and 2025-26. Exports have grown more slowly: non-petroleum goods exports rose about 53% over 12 years, compared with a much larger rise in the previous 12 years from a smaller base.
The toolkit
Make in India works through several instruments rather than one scheme.
- 1Production Linked IncentivePays on incremental sales
- 2PM GatiShaktiPlans infrastructure and logistics
- 3National Single Window SystemEases approvals
- 4FDI reformsOpens sectors to foreign investment
Why output grew but jobs did not
Much of the growth came from capital-intensive and assembly-led units. Incentives such as the Production Linked Incentive favour large plants, which add output faster than workers. Components are still largely imported, so domestic value addition stays low, and high input costs, including from Quality Control Orders, weigh on small firms.
- Manufacturing output
- Investment in PLI sectors
- Mobile phone exports
- Manufacturing share of GDP
- Manufacturing share of jobs
- Overall export growth rate
How we got here
Policy has shifted from broad campaigns to targeted incentives.
- 25 Sep 2014Make in India launched
- 2020PLI schemes begin with electronics
- March 2026PLI investment crosses ₹2.40 lakh crore
- July 2026₹62,500 crore Mobile Phone Manufacturing Scheme
- Sep 202612-year assessments
What is still unsolved
India still has to shift workers from farms into factories, which needs labour-intensive sectors such as apparel, footwear and food processing, cheaper inputs, better logistics and deeper supplier networks. Without that, manufacturing may keep growing without changing the structure of employment, a pattern economists call Premature deindustrialisation.
You now know
- Make in India was launched on 25 September 2014 with a 25% manufacturing share target.
- Manufacturing GVA grew about 10.9% a year from 2022-23 to 2025-26, but its share of GDP and jobs barely changed.
- Non-petroleum exports rose about 53% in 12 years, from $253.5 billion to $388.3 billion.
- PLI schemes drew over ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment by March 2026.
Go deeper
In one line: Make in India raised manufacturing output and investment, but it has not shifted jobs or GDP share towards factories the way it promised.
Why it matters for UPSC
GS3 regularly asks about industrial policy, jobless growth and export competitiveness. Make in India at 12 is a ready case study for all three.
The core idea
Imagine a factory that doubles its output but hires almost no one new. That is the pattern here: output grew fast, especially under Production Linked Incentive schemes, but much of it came from capital-intensive, often assembly-heavy units. The deeper goal, moving workers out of low-productivity farming into manufacturing, has barely moved.
Exports tell the same story. They grew, but more slowly than in the previous 12 years, as global trade weakened and India's input costs stayed high because of tariffs, logistics and Quality Control Orders.
Numbers and dates to remember
- 25 September 2014: launch.
- 25%: the original manufacturing share target.
- About 10.9% a year: manufacturing GVA growth, 2022-23 to 2025-26.
- $253.5 billion to $388.3 billion: non-petroleum exports, 2014-15 to 2025-26.
Where to go next
- Production Linked Incentive: How India pays for output
- Premature deindustrialisation: Why services grew before factories did
- Global value chains: Where India fits in making things
- Quality Control Orders: A hidden cost for manufacturers
In one line: Make in India has built capacity in selected sectors, but structural transformation needs labour-intensive growth, cheaper inputs and deeper supply chains.
Why capital-intensive growth creates few jobs
Incentive schemes reward output and incremental sales. Large, automated plants respond fastest, so output rises quickly while employment rises slowly. Labour-intensive sectors such as apparel and footwear face higher costs, rigid factor markets and strong competition from Bangladesh and Vietnam.
The value-addition problem
In electronics, much production is assembly of imported components. Real gains come from moving up Global value chains into components, which is what the ₹62,500 crore Mobile Phone Manufacturing Scheme approved in July 2026 targets.
The cost of inputs
Tariffs on intermediate goods and mandatory standards on inputs raise costs for downstream manufacturers. The government rolled back several Quality Control Orders in late 2025 for this reason.
Premature deindustrialisation
India's manufacturing share appears to have peaked at a lower level of income than in East Asia, with services growing first. This Premature deindustrialisation makes it harder for manufacturing to absorb workers leaving agriculture.
What would change the picture
- Incentives tied to employment and domestic value addition.
- Lower tariffs on inputs.
- Plug-and-play industrial parks and labour-code implementation.
Where to go next
- Production Linked Incentive: How India pays for output
- Premature deindustrialisation: Why services grew before factories did
- Global value chains: Where India fits in making things
- Quality Control Orders: A hidden cost for manufacturers
Production Linked Incentive
How India pays for output
In one line: PLI schemes pay companies a percentage of their incremental sales over a base year, to attract large-scale manufacturing in selected sectors.
How it works
Firms that meet investment and sales thresholds receive an incentive on sales above a base year for a fixed period. This rewards scale and output rather than just investment.
Where it began
PLI started in 2020 with large-scale electronics manufacturing, mainly mobile phones, and was extended to many sectors including pharmaceuticals, auto components and specialty steel.
Results and criticism
By March 2026, PLI schemes had attracted more than ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment, and mobile phone exports grew sharply. Critics point to low domestic value addition in assembly, slow disbursement in some sectors, and the risk of paying subsidies for production that might have happened anyway.
Where to go next
- Premature deindustrialisation: Why services grew before factories did
- Global value chains: Where India fits in making things
Premature deindustrialisation
Why services grew before factories did
In one line: Premature deindustrialisation means manufacturing's share of jobs and output peaks and declines at a much lower income level than it did in today's rich countries.
The idea
Economist Dani Rodrik observed that many developing countries saw manufacturing shrink before they became rich. In earlier industrialisers, factories absorbed workers leaving farms and raised productivity across the economy.
India's case
India's manufacturing share has stayed roughly flat for decades, while services such as IT grew fast. Services created high-productivity jobs for skilled workers but not enough jobs for the large number of low-skilled workers leaving agriculture.
Why it matters
Without a manufacturing surge, it is harder to raise productivity and wages for the majority of workers. That is why jobs, not just output, are the real test of Make in India.
Where to go next
- Production Linked Incentive: How India pays for output
- Global value chains: Where India fits in making things
Global value chains
Where India fits in making things
In one line: Global value chains split the production of a good into stages carried out in different countries, from design to components to assembly.
Why they matter
A phone may be designed in one country, use chips from another and be assembled in a third. Countries gain most by moving into higher-value stages such as components, design and branding, rather than only assembly.
India's position
India has gained in final assembly, especially of mobile phones, as firms diversify away from China. It is weaker in components and intermediate goods, where East Asian countries dominate.
What helps integration
Low tariffs on inputs, fast customs and logistics, reliable power, skilled workers and trade agreements with major markets. High input tariffs tend to push firms to produce elsewhere.
Where to go next
- Production Linked Incentive: How India pays for output
- Premature deindustrialisation: Why services grew before factories did
Quality Control Orders
A hidden cost for manufacturers
In one line: Quality Control Orders make Bureau of Indian Standards certification mandatory for notified products, and applied to inputs they have raised costs for manufacturers.
Legal basis
QCOs are issued by ministries under the BIS Act, 2016.
The problem with input QCOs
NITI Aayog observed that about 70% of recent QCOs target raw materials and intermediates. A 2025 study by CSEP found they suppressed imports of inputs needed for domestic production without significantly improving exports.
Rollback
In November 2025, QCOs on several chemicals, polymers and fibres were withdrawn, and in January 2026 the omnibus machinery safety QCO was withdrawn. Experts caution that removing QCOs must be paired with monitoring for dumping of substandard goods.
Where to go next
- Production Linked Incentive: How India pays for output
- Premature deindustrialisation: Why services grew before factories did
Take the 25 September 2026 quiz: 30 Prelims-style questions with answers