India's Russian oil purchases fall after new U.S. curbs
Discounted oil or access to America. Can India keep both?
Published 19 September 2026. Written by Pratidin from the reports linked at the end; every fact checked by a separate review before publishing. How we work
Tanker-tracking data suggest India's purchases of Russian oil have fallen after the latest U.S. curbs. On 18 September 2026, President Donald Trump signed H.R. 5334, whose Division A is the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, after the Senate passed it 86-11 in August and the House 262-159 in September.
The Act widens sanctions on Russia's energy sector, its officials, defence-industrial collaborators and the 'shadow fleet' of tankers used to evade sanctions, and extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to 2031. Its Section 113 authorises, but does not automatically impose, an additional U.S. tariff of up to 100% on goods from countries that meet criteria linked to buying Russian energy or evading sanctions. It can also hit banks, ship owners, insurers and ports involved in such trade.
India is heavily exposed. Russia became India's largest crude supplier after the 2022 Ukraine war, and by one estimate accounted for a record 48.6% of India's crude import bill by value in June 2026, partly because supplies through the Strait of Hormuz have been constrained. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said India is examining the law, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar raised it with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 23 September.
Prelims facts
- Primary sanctions restrict a country's own firms; secondary sanctions penalise third countries that deal with the sanctioned state.
- The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, signed on 18 September 2026, lets the U.S. impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries linked to buying Russian energy.
- CAATSA (2017) is an earlier U.S. law allowing sanctions on countries making significant defence purchases from Russia.
Quick recall
- When was the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act signed?
- On 18 September 2026, as Division A of H.R. 5334.
- What were the votes on the Act?
- 86-11 in the US Senate (August) and 262-159 in the House (September).
- What does Section 113 of the Act authorise?
- An additional US tariff of up to 100% on goods from countries meeting criteria linked to buying Russian energy or evading sanctions.
- Does the Act automatically impose a 100% tariff on India?
- No. It creates the power; the tariff must be applied under specified conditions.
- What is the difference between primary and secondary sanctions?
- Primary sanctions restrict a country's own firms; secondary sanctions penalise third countries dealing with the sanctioned state.
- What is CAATSA?
- The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017, allowing sanctions on significant defence deals with Russia.
- What share of India's crude import bill did Russia account for in June 2026, by one estimate?
- A record 48.6% by value.
- Which Indian ministers responded to the Act?
- Piyush Goyal said India is examining it; S. Jaishankar raised it with Marco Rubio on 23 September.
Prelims practice question
CAATSA, often discussed in the context of India-Russia defence deals, is a law of:
- The European Union
- The United States
- The United Kingdom
- The United Nations
Show answer
Answer: (b) The United States. The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act was passed by the US Congress in 2017.
Use this in UPSC Mains: previous-year questions
Recurring theme: Energy security and strategic autonomy in India's relations with the US and Russia
- How to use this
Gives a live external challenge to energy security from secondary sanctions, and the measures India can take.
- Russia accounted for a record 48.6% of India's crude import bill by value in June 2026, by one estimate, partly because Strait of Hormuz supplies were constrained.
- Section 113 of the 2026 US Act authorises, but does not impose, up to 100% tariffs on countries linked to buying Russian energy; tanker-tracking data suggest India's purchases have since fallen.
- Suggest diversifying suppliers (US, Gulf, Latin America, Africa), strategic reserves and payment alternatives.
- How to use this
Shows energy purchases becoming a foreign policy bargaining issue with the US, and how India is handling it.
- Russia became India's largest crude supplier after the 2022 Ukraine war; the 2026 US Act now ties such purchases to the threat of up to 100% tariffs.
- Piyush Goyal said India is examining the law, and S. Jaishankar raised it with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 23 September 2026.
- Argue that strategic autonomy means keeping options open and bargaining, including seeking waivers as India did over CAATSA.
- How to use this
Supplies the stakes India has with both Russia and the US in defence, and the sanctions pressure linking them; it has little on the Indo-Pacific.
- Note that a large part of India's military equipment is Russian in origin, including the S-400.
- The US is India's largest export market and a key technology and defence partner through iCET and the Quad.
- CAATSA (2017) allows US sanctions on countries making significant defence purchases from Russia, and the 2026 Act extends similar pressure to energy.
- How to use this
Lets you argue that sanctions on Russian oil raise the value of diversified supply, including from the Gulf.
- By one estimate, Russia accounted for a record 48.6% of India's crude import bill by value in June 2026, partly because Hormuz supplies were constrained.
- Tanker-tracking data suggest India's Russian oil purchases have fallen after the new US curbs.
- Recommend diversifying suppliers across the US, the Gulf, Latin America and Africa, with strategic reserves.
Mains practice question
Secondary sanctions test the limits of India's strategic autonomy. Examine with reference to India's energy and defence ties with Russia. (250 words)
Model answer
Secondary sanctions penalise third countries for dealing with a sanctioned state. US curbs on buyers of Russian oil, alongside CAATSA (2017) on defence deals, put India's long-standing ties with Russia under pressure.
India's stakes with Russia
- Energy: after 2022, discounted Russian crude became a large share of India's imports, easing inflation and the import bill.
- Defence: a large part of India's military equipment is Russian in origin, including the S-400.
- Strategic balance: Russia helps India avoid over-dependence on any single power and balances China-Russia closeness.
Stakes with the US
- Largest export market and a key technology and defence partner (iCET, Quad).
- Access to the dollar system; banks and shippers comply with US sanctions.
How sanctions constrain autonomy
- Refiners, insurers and banks cut exposure, as falling purchases show.
- Payment problems push trade to rupee or third-currency channels.
- Tariff threats link energy choices to trade access.
India's approach
- Buy from where it gets the best deal while staying within price-cap mechanisms.
- Diversify suppliers: US, Gulf, Latin America and Africa.
- Diplomacy: raise the issue with Washington and seek waivers, as with CAATSA.
- Strategic reserves and payment alternatives.
Assessment
Strategic autonomy does not mean ignoring costs; it means keeping options open and bargaining. India's diversification and quiet adjustment show autonomy exercised pragmatically.
The lesson is to reduce vulnerability through diversified energy sources, indigenous defence production and resilient payment systems.
The basics
Why this matters
Since 2022, discounted Russian crude has become a large part of India's oil imports, helping control fuel costs. A US law signed on 18 September 2026 lets Washington impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries buying Russian energy, forcing India to weigh energy security against access to its biggest export market.
What the Act does
It widens sanctions and creates new tariff powers.
- 1Energy sectorSanctions on Russian oil and gas
- 2Shadow fleetTankers used to evade sanctions
- 3Section 113Tariffs of up to 100% on qualifying countries
- 4IranIran Sanctions Act extended to 2031
Primary versus secondary sanctions
The key idea is Secondary sanctions.
- Bind the sanctioning country's own firms
- Direct ban on dealings
- Penalise third countries
- Through tariffs or loss of US market access
How we got here
Pressure has built over several years.
- 2017CAATSA enacted
- 2022India's Russian oil imports surge
- Nov 2025US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil take effect
- Aug 2026Senate passes the Act 86-11
- 18 Sep 2026Act signed into law
India's choices
India has balanced such pressure before, as with the S-400 deal under CAATSA. Its principle of Strategic autonomy means diversifying suppliers, negotiating with Washington and building buffers such as Strategic petroleum reserves.
You now know
- The Act was signed on 18 September 2026 as Division A of H.R. 5334.
- Section 113 authorises, but does not automatically impose, tariffs of up to 100%.
- Secondary sanctions target third countries dealing with a sanctioned state.
- Russia was estimated at 48.6% of India's crude import bill by value in June 2026.
Go deeper
In one line: A new US law lets Washington impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries buying Russian energy, squeezing India's access to discounted oil.
Why it matters for UPSC
GS2 (effect of other countries' policies on India, strategic autonomy) and GS3 (energy security). It is a textbook case of secondary sanctions.
The core idea
After 2022, India bought large amounts of discounted Russian oil, keeping fuel costs and inflation down. The US has now written into law the power to punish such buyers through tariffs on their exports to America, India's largest export market. Banks, insurers and shippers react first, which is why Indian purchases have already fallen. India's options are diplomacy, diversifying suppliers and building payment and energy resilience, the same balancing act it used with CAATSA over the S-400.
Numbers and dates to remember
- 18 September 2026: Act signed.
- Up to 100%: possible tariff under Section 113.
- 48.6%: Russia's share of India's crude import bill in June 2026 (one estimate).
Where to go next
- Secondary sanctions: How pressure reaches third countries
- CAATSA: The earlier US sanctions law
- Strategic autonomy: India's foreign policy principle
- Strategic petroleum reserves: India's buffer against shocks
In one line: The law turns US pressure on Russian oil buyers into a standing legal power that can be used against India at any time.
How markets react first
Banks, insurers and shipping firms avoid risk before any tariff is imposed, which is why Indian purchases fell soon after the law.
India's exposure
Russia supplied a record share of India's crude by value in mid-2026, partly because supplies through the Strait of Hormuz were constrained.
Options
- Diplomacy to secure waivers or exemptions.
- Diversify to the Gulf, the US, Africa and Latin America.
- Use Strategic petroleum reserves as a buffer.
- Maintain Strategic autonomy while avoiding direct confrontation.
Precedent
Under CAATSA, India bought the S-400 system without sanctions being imposed, showing how negotiation can manage Secondary sanctions risk.
Where to go next
- Secondary sanctions: How pressure reaches third countries
- CAATSA: The earlier US sanctions law
- Strategic autonomy: India's foreign policy principle
- Strategic petroleum reserves: India's buffer against shocks
Secondary sanctions
How pressure reaches third countries
In one line: Secondary sanctions penalise third-country firms or governments for dealing with a sanctioned state.
How they work
Threats of losing access to the US financial system, blocking of assets, or tariffs on exports to the US.
Why they bite
The dollar's central role makes most global banks comply.
Examples
US sanctions on Iran's oil buyers and the 2026 law targeting buyers of Russian energy.
Where to go next
- CAATSA: The earlier US sanctions law
- Strategic autonomy: India's foreign policy principle
CAATSA
The earlier US sanctions law
In one line: The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017 lets the US sanction countries making significant defence deals with Russia, Iran or North Korea.
India's case
India's purchase of the S-400 air defence system raised the threat of sanctions.
Outcome
The US has not imposed CAATSA sanctions on India, reflecting strategic ties.
Contrast
Turkey was sanctioned under CAATSA in 2020 for buying the S-400.
Where to go next
- Secondary sanctions: How pressure reaches third countries
- Strategic autonomy: India's foreign policy principle
Strategic autonomy
India's foreign policy principle
In one line: Strategic autonomy is India's principle of making foreign policy choices based on its own interests, without being tied to any bloc.
Roots
It grows out of non-alignment.
In practice
Partnerships with the US, Russia, Europe and the Gulf at the same time, and multi-alignment in groupings like the Quad, BRICS and the SCO.
Test cases
Russian oil and defence purchases alongside deepening ties with the US.
Where to go next
- Secondary sanctions: How pressure reaches third countries
- CAATSA: The earlier US sanctions law
Strategic petroleum reserves
India's buffer against shocks
In one line: Strategic petroleum reserves are emergency crude oil stocks held to cushion supply disruptions.
India's facilities
Underground caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur, run by Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Ltd.
Capacity
About 5.33 million tonnes, covering several days of consumption.
Expansion
New caverns planned at Chandikhol and Padur.
Where to go next
- Secondary sanctions: How pressure reaches third countries
- CAATSA: The earlier US sanctions law
Strategic petroleum reserves: every story that connects to it (2)
Take the 19 September 2026 quiz: 30 Prelims-style questions with answers