"Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India's foreign policy, and is linked with India's overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries." How would you integrate energy security with India's foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?

Shows India keeping energy and economic ties with Gulf states insulated from OIC criticism on Kashmir.

• India rejected the OIC Contact Group's remarks on Jammu and Kashmir, saying the OIC has no locus standi, while building bilateral ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
• The Gulf supplies much of India's oil and hosts nearly 9 million Indians who send large remittances.
• India engages the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman directly on trade, energy, investment and security, bypassing the OIC as a bloc.

Shows energy purchases becoming a foreign policy bargaining issue with the US, and how India is handling it.

• Russia became India's largest crude supplier after the 2022 Ukraine war; the 2026 US Act now ties such purchases to the threat of up to 100% tariffs.
• Piyush Goyal said India is examining the law, and S. Jaishankar raised it with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 23 September 2026.
• Argue that strategic autonomy means keeping options open and bargaining, including seeking waivers as India did over CAATSA.

Argue, citing The Hindu's lead article, that India's Gulf policy built on oil, jobs and remittances must now add a maritime security role to protect its energy interests.

• The lead article says India has treated the Gulf as a 'source of crude oil, employment and remittances' through multi-alignment with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and the UAE.
• It argues 'economic relationships cannot protect infrastructure from drones, asymmetric warfare, terrorism and maritime disruption', citing the Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan Mecca Joint Defence Agreement of 7 August 2026.
• It urges joint naval patrols, logistics access and information sharing across Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb, via flexible minilaterals rather than alliances.

Escalation over Iran's nuclear programme shows why India's West Asia diplomacy must prioritise de-escalation to protect energy and shipping through Hormuz.

• A joint U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran's nuclear and missile infrastructure began in February 2026; Iran warned it would retaliate against the IAEA referral.
• India, outside the NPT, depends on West Asian energy and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, so its stakes lie in de-escalation.
• India should use groupings where it has a voice to press for a ceasefire, backing verification while opposing discriminatory regimes.

The Mokha capture shows that India's West Asia policy must include securing sea lanes through naval presence and regional diplomacy.

• The Houthis captured Mokha, the first port north of the Bab el-Mandeb (about 26 km wide at its narrowest), on 10 September 2026, improving their position to threaten shipping.
• Houthi attacks on shipping since 19 November 2023 pushed ships around the Cape of Good Hope, raising freight and insurance costs; the Indian Navy has patrolled the Gulf of Aden since 2008.
• Conclude that India must combine naval readiness with diplomacy across West Asia, sharing information with regional states and coalitions while keeping strategic autonomy.

The shutdown shows why India's West Asia diplomacy must secure supply routes such as Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, tying energy security to regional stability.

• Saudi Arabia shut its 1,200 km East-West pipeline (Abqaiq to Yanbu, up to 7 million bpd) on 11 September 2026 after a drone attack on a pumping station.
• Petroline was built in the 1980s to bypass Hormuz, yet oil from Yanbu must still pass the Bab el-Mandeb to reach Asia; the line was hit in May 2019 and April 2026 too.
• BRICS leaders in New Delhi the same week called for the free flow of energy; India can use BRICS, I2U2 and Gulf partnerships, and naval escort, to keep sea lanes safe.

Shows energy security forcing India to balance the US, Russia and other suppliers, and the options open to it.

• The US Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, signed on 18 September 2026, lets the President impose tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian crude or gas.
• India imports over 88% of its crude and relies on Russia for roughly half of those imports; it has conveyed energy security concerns and is expected to seek a waiver.
• India has earlier cut oil imports from Iran and Venezuela under US pressure; suggest diversifying supply from West Asia, Africa and the Americas.