What is the significance of Indo-US defence deals over Indo-Russian defence deals? Discuss with reference to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Supplies the stakes India has with both Russia and the US in defence, and the sanctions pressure linking them; it has little on the Indo-Pacific.

• Note that a large part of India's military equipment is Russian in origin, including the S-400.
• The US is India's largest export market and a key technology and defence partner through iCET and the Quad.
• CAATSA (2017) allows US sanctions on countries making significant defence purchases from Russia, and the 2026 Act extends similar pressure to energy.

Use Japan as an emerging third source of defence technology to argue that India diversifies partners while guarding strategic autonomy between the US and Russia.

• India and Japan are pursuing the UNICORN (Unified Complex Radio Antenna) stealthy integrated mast with Bharat Electronics Limited, and DRDO is deepening links with Japan's ATLA.
• India's strategic autonomy and ties with Russia sit uneasily with Japan's alliance with the United States, a tension India must manage as it adds partners for Indo-Pacific stability.
• Caution on delivery: the proposed purchase of Japan's US-2 amphibious aircraft stalled over price, local production and technology sharing, and Article 9 of Japan's Constitution limits co-development of lethal weapons.

Yudh Abhyas and the four foundational agreements show the interoperability and technology exposure that India-U.S. defence ties offer.

• India and the U.S. signed GSOMIA (2002), LEMOA (29 August 2016), COMCASA (September 2018) and BECA (2020), the base for operational cooperation.
• The 22nd Yudh Abhyas (2026) covers high-altitude warfare, long-range precision fires and counter-drone operations; the U.S. deployed its MLIDS counter-drone system in India for the first time.
• It runs under the U.S. Army's Operation Pathways framework for interoperability with Indo-Pacific partners, while India continues to buy equipment from several countries.

The S-400 shows both the operational value of a Russian deal and its costs, Russian dependence and U.S. sanctions risk, the trade-off at the core of this question.

• India signed the S-400 contract with Russia on 5 October 2018 for five squadrons worth about $5.43 billion; the first squadron arrived in December 2021.
• The Defence Ministry's Annual Report 2025-26 says an IAF S-400 unit destroyed a Pakistani special-mission aircraft 314 km away during Operation Sindoor (7 to 10 May 2025).
• U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warned in March 2021 that the purchase could trigger CAATSA sanctions, and spares, missiles and upgrades still come from Russia.

Gives a parallel case of US pressure over India's ties with Russia, useful to discuss CAATSA-type risks; it has nothing on defence deals or the Indo-Pacific.

• Note that CAATSA (2017) created a similar US threat over India's defence deals with Russia.
• The 2026 US law uses US market access to shape third countries' purchases from Russia, with a national-interest waiver the President can certify to Congress.
• Argue that India should defend sovereign choices while avoiding being seen as funding the war in Ukraine.