Trump signs Russia sanctions law that allows up to 100% tariffs on buyers like India
A U.S. law now lets Washington tax India's exports for buying Russian oil. How much room does India have?
Published 20 September 2026. Written by Pratidin from the reports linked at the end; every fact checked by a separate review before publishing. How we work
On 18 September 2026 U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law. The Senate passed the revised bill (H.R. 5334) 86-11 on 7 August, and the House agreed to it 262-159 on 16 September. It grew out of the Sanctioning Russia Act (S. 1241) that Senator Lindsey Graham introduced with Senator Richard Blumenthal on 1 April 2025, and was renamed after Graham died on 12 July 2026. The law raises U.S. tariffs on all goods from Russia to up to 500%. It also allows the President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from each of the five largest importers, by volume, of Russian crude oil and of Russian natural gas over the 12 months before enactment, if they knowingly make new purchases on or after 30 days from enactment.
Other provisions: sanctions on Russia's 'shadow fleet' (ageing tankers used to move oil outside Western price and shipping rules), a reassessment of which countries qualify every 180 days, a waiver if the President certifies to Congress that it is in the U.S. national interest, termination if Russia agrees to peace or if third countries stop the sanctionable conduct, a five-year extension of the Iran Sanctions Act to 2031, and a sunset of the new tariff and sanctions powers five years after enactment. The tariffs are a power, not an automatic levy: the President 'may' impose them and can set any rate up to 100%.
India is exposed because it is among the largest buyers of Russian crude. Reports noted that India imports over 88% of its crude oil and relies on Russia for roughly half of those imports, and a Reuters estimate puts China and India at about 70% of Russia's international energy business. The Hindu's explainer says cutting Russian purchases within 30 days would be hard, especially with shipping through the Strait of Hormuz constrained, and that India has in the past cut oil imports from Venezuela and Iran under U.S. pressure. India has conveyed its energy security concerns to Washington and is expected to seek a waiver. Supporters of the law say it targets the revenue that funds Russia's war in Ukraine; critics in India see a secondary tariff that punishes a sovereign energy choice and could hurt export competitiveness and raise domestic fuel prices.
Prelims facts
- The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 was signed by President Trump on 18 September 2026.
- It raises U.S. tariffs on goods from Russia to up to 500% and lets the President impose up to 100% tariffs on the top five importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas.
- The third-country tariffs apply to new purchases made on or after 30 days from enactment; eligibility is reassessed every 180 days.
- The President can waive the measures by certifying to Congress that a waiver is in the U.S. national interest; the powers sunset after five years.
- The law also extends the U.S. Iran Sanctions Act by five years, to 2031.
Quick recall
- When was the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act signed?
- 18 September 2026.
- What is the maximum tariff the Act allows on imports from Russia?
- Up to 500%.
- What tariff can the President impose on top buyers of Russian oil or gas?
- Up to 100% on each of the top five importers.
- After how many days from enactment do new purchases become sanctionable?
- 30 days.
- How often is the list of eligible countries reassessed?
- Every 180 days.
- How can the tariffs be waived?
- By a presidential certification to Congress that the waiver is in the U.S. national interest.
- What does the Act do to the Iran Sanctions Act?
- Extends it by five years, to 2031.
- What are secondary sanctions?
- Penalties on third countries or firms for dealing with a sanctioned state.
Prelims practice question
With reference to the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 of the United States, consider the following statements:
1. It makes a 100% tariff on imports from the top five buyers of Russian oil automatic from the date of enactment.
2. It allows the U.S. President to waive its tariffs or sanctions by certifying to Congress that a waiver is in the national interest.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- 1 only
- 2 only
- Both 1 and 2
- Neither 1 nor 2
Show answer
Answer: (b) 2 only. Statement 1 is incorrect: the President 'may' impose tariffs of up to 100%, and only on new purchases made on or after 30 days from enactment. Statement 2 is correct: a national interest certification to Congress allows a waiver.
Use this in UPSC Mains: previous-year questions
Recurring theme: Energy security and the effect of major powers' policies on India's interests
- How to use this
Shows energy security forcing India to balance the US, Russia and other suppliers, and the options open to it.
- The US Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, signed on 18 September 2026, lets the President impose tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian crude or gas.
- India imports over 88% of its crude and relies on Russia for roughly half of those imports; it has conveyed energy security concerns and is expected to seek a waiver.
- India has earlier cut oil imports from Iran and Venezuela under US pressure; suggest diversifying supply from West Asia, Africa and the Americas.
- How to use this
Gives a current external threat to India's energy security and the buffers needed against it.
- The 2026 US law threatens up to 100% tariffs on top buyers of Russian oil making new purchases 30 days after enactment, with eligibility reassessed every 180 days.
- The Hindu's explainer says cutting Russian purchases within 30 days would be hard, especially with shipping through the Strait of Hormuz constrained.
- Suggest expanding strategic petroleum reserves, refinery flexibility, long-term contracts, and speeding up renewables, electric mobility and biofuels.
- How to use this
Gives a parallel case of US pressure over India's ties with Russia, useful to discuss CAATSA-type risks; it has nothing on defence deals or the Indo-Pacific.
- Note that CAATSA (2017) created a similar US threat over India's defence deals with Russia.
- The 2026 US law uses US market access to shape third countries' purchases from Russia, with a national-interest waiver the President can certify to Congress.
- Argue that India should defend sovereign choices while avoiding being seen as funding the war in Ukraine.
Mains practice question
Secondary sanctions by major powers increasingly test India's strategic autonomy. Discuss with reference to the new U.S. law on buyers of Russian oil, and suggest how India should protect its energy security. (250 words)
Model answer
Secondary sanctions penalise third countries for dealing with a sanctioned state. The U.S. Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, signed on 18 September 2026, lets the President impose tariffs of up to 100% on the top five importers of Russian oil or gas, which includes India.
Why it tests strategic autonomy
- Energy security: India imports most of its crude, and discounted Russian oil has become a large share of that basket.
- Extraterritorial reach: the law uses U.S. market access to shape India's sovereign purchasing decisions.
- Trade exposure: a 100% tariff would badly hurt labour-intensive exports to India's largest export market.
- Past precedent: India cut oil purchases from Iran and Venezuela under U.S. pressure; CAATSA (2017) created a similar threat over defence deals with Russia.
India's options
- Seek a waiver: the law allows a national interest waiver; India can argue that stable global oil prices serve U.S. interests too.
- Diversify supply: widen sourcing from West Asia, Africa and the Americas, and use long-term contracts.
- Build buffers: expand strategic petroleum reserves and refinery flexibility.
- Cut demand for oil: speed up renewables, electric mobility and biofuels.
- Diplomacy: link the issue to the India-U.S. trade negotiations and coordinate with other affected buyers.
Balance
- India should avoid being seen as funding the war while defending the principle that energy purchases are a sovereign choice.
Strategic autonomy in energy will ultimately rest on diversified supply and lower oil dependence, not on any single supplier or waiver.
The basics
Why this matters
A country usually sanctions its adversary directly. The new U.S. law goes one step further: it threatens tariffs on countries that keep buying from that adversary. This is the logic of Secondary sanctions, and India, a major buyer of Russian crude, is squarely in its path. The story is a test of Strategic autonomy and of India's crude oil import dependence.
What the law does
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 was signed on 18 September 2026. It targets Russia's income from oil and gas, which pays for its war in Ukraine.
- 1Tariffs on RussiaUp to 500% on all U.S. imports from Russia
- 2Tariffs on big buyersUp to 100% on each of the top five importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas
- 3Shadow fleetSanctions on the tankers that carry Russian oil outside Western rules
- 4WaiverPresident may waive by certifying national interest to Congress
- 5IranIran Sanctions Act extended by five years, to 2031
How the tariff trigger works
The tariff does not fall automatically. The law identifies the five largest importers of Russian crude and of Russian gas in the 12 months before enactment. If such a country knowingly makes new purchases on or after 30 days from enactment, the President may impose tariffs up to 100% on its goods. The list is reassessed every 180 days, so a country that cuts purchases can drop off.
- 1Day 0Law signed on 18 September 2026
- 2Identify buyersTop five importers of Russian crude and gas in the previous 12 months
- 3Day 30New purchases from this point become sanctionable
- 4Presidential choiceImpose tariffs up to 100%, or waive in the national interest
- 5Every 180 daysEligibility of countries is reassessed
Why India is exposed
Reports note that India imports over 88% of its crude oil and that Russia supplies roughly half of those imports. A Reuters estimate puts China and India together at about 70% of Russia's international energy business. Cutting that quickly is hard: refineries are set up for particular crude grades, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the route for much West Asian oil, has been constrained.
- Cuts the revenue that funds Russia's war
- Pressures buyers who blunt existing sanctions
- Waivers keep flexibility
- Energy purchases are a sovereign choice
- Could raise domestic fuel prices
- Would hit export competitiveness in the U.S. market
What to remember
The new law is a power, not a verdict. How India negotiates a waiver, diversifies supply and reduces oil demand will decide its real cost.
Go deeper
In one line: A new U.S. law lets the President put tariffs of up to 100% on the goods of the biggest buyers of Russian oil and gas, and India is one of them.
Why it matters for UPSC
GS2 asks about the 'effect of policies and politics of developed countries on India's interests', and GS3 about energy security. This law joins both: a U.S. domestic statute that could reshape India's oil imports and exports.
The core idea
The law uses Secondary sanctions: rather than only punishing Russia, it threatens countries that keep buying Russian energy. India is exposed because of India's crude oil import dependence and its large purchases of discounted Russian crude since 2022. Similar pressure came earlier through CAATSA, 2017 on defence deals. How India responds is a test of Strategic autonomy, its policy of keeping options open with all major powers.
Numbers and dates to remember
- Signed: 18 September 2026; Senate 86-11 (7 August); House 262-159 (16 September).
- Tariff on Russia: up to 500%. On top five buyers of Russian crude or gas: up to 100%.
- Trigger: new purchases on or after 30 days from enactment; reassessment every 180 days.
- Sunset: five years. Iran Sanctions Act extended to 2031.
Where to go next
- Secondary sanctions: how sanctions reach third countries.
- India's crude oil import dependence: why oil is India's soft spot.
- CAATSA, 2017: the earlier U.S. law that tested India over Russian arms.
- Strategic autonomy: the principle India invokes in such disputes.
Go deeper: waiver, compliance or resistance?
The case for quiet compliance. India has adjusted before: it cut oil imports from Iran and Venezuela under U.S. pressure. The U.S. is India's largest export market, and a 100% tariff would hurt jobs in labour-intensive sectors. Diversifying crude sources reduces risk anyway.
The case for resisting. Energy purchases are a sovereign decision, and India's argument is that its buying of Russian crude helped keep global prices stable. Yielding to Secondary sanctions each time sets a precedent that any major power can dictate India's trade. Strategic autonomy means refusing to be bound by another country's domestic law.
The middle path: the waiver. The law allows a national interest waiver, and the tariff is a ceiling ('up to 100%'), not a fixed rate. The CAATSA, 2017 episode shows that a threat can stay a threat for years when both sides value the partnership. India can bargain by linking the issue to trade talks and to its role in stabilising oil markets.
Structural fix. Because of India's crude oil import dependence, the long-term answer is lower oil demand (renewables, electric mobility, biofuels), strategic reserves and long-term contracts with several suppliers. The 30-day and 180-day clocks in the law reward flexibility: a refinery system that can switch crude grades quickly gives India room to negotiate.
Secondary sanctions
How a country's sanctions reach buyers in third countries.
In one line: Secondary sanctions penalise third countries or firms for doing business with a country that is under primary sanctions.
Primary versus secondary
Primary sanctions bar a country's own citizens and companies from dealing with a target. Secondary sanctions go further: they threaten outsiders, for example by cutting them off from the sanctioning country's market or banking system, if they keep dealing with the target. They work because of the size of the U.S. economy and the role of the dollar.
Tariffs as a new tool
The 2026 U.S. law uses tariffs rather than only financial penalties: the President may impose up to 100% tariffs on goods from the top five buyers of Russian crude oil or gas. This is sometimes called a 'secondary tariff'.
Why it is in the news
India, one of the largest buyers of Russian crude, could face such tariffs unless it cuts new purchases or wins a waiver.
Where to go next
India's crude oil import dependence
Why oil is India's biggest external vulnerability.
In one line: India imports the large majority of the crude oil it refines, so its economy is exposed to supply shocks, price spikes and political pressure on its suppliers.
The shape of the problem
Reports on the new U.S. law noted that India imports over 88% of its crude oil. Since 2022, discounted Russian crude has become a large part of that basket; reports put Russia's share at roughly half of India's oil imports. Much of the rest comes from West Asia through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that has faced disruptions.
Why switching is hard
Refineries are tuned to particular grades of crude, contracts run for months, and shipping routes take time to change. That is why a 30-day window to cut Russian purchases is tight.
Ways to reduce exposure
Diversified suppliers, strategic petroleum reserves, long-term contracts, and lower oil demand through renewables, electric vehicles and biofuels.
Where to go next
CAATSA, 2017
The earlier U.S. law that threatened India over Russian arms.
In one line: The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), enacted by the U.S. in 2017, allows sanctions on those who make significant transactions with Russia's defence or intelligence sectors, among other targets.
Why it mattered for India
India buys much of its military equipment from Russia. Its purchase of the S-400 air defence system raised the question of whether the U.S. would apply CAATSA to India. The law gave the U.S. President room to decide, and India argued that its defence choices are sovereign and that punishing a partner would harm shared interests.
The lesson
CAATSA showed how a U.S. domestic law can hang over India's foreign policy choices, and how diplomacy and waivers can keep a threat from turning into action. The 2026 oil sanctions law follows the same pattern, but uses tariffs on trade.
Where to go next
Strategic autonomy
The principle India invokes when major powers press it to pick sides.
In one line: Strategic autonomy is India's aim to take foreign policy decisions on its own interests, keeping ties with all major powers instead of joining a single bloc.
Roots
The idea grew out of non-alignment after independence. Today it is often described as multi-alignment: India works with the U.S. in groupings such as the Quad while keeping long-standing defence and energy ties with Russia and participating in BRICS and the SCO.
How it is tested
Strategic autonomy is easy to state and hard to practise when a partner can impose costs. Laws like CAATSA and the 2026 oil sanctions law use access to the U.S. market to press India to change course.
Why it is in the news
India's response to the new U.S. law, whether it seeks a waiver, cuts Russian purchases or resists, will show how far its autonomy holds under economic pressure.
Where to go next
- India's crude oil import dependence
- CAATSA, 2017
Take the 20 September 2026 quiz: 30 Prelims-style questions with answers